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LIBERTY, COMMUNITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE:
A RECONSIDERATION OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
JAMES A. GARDNERt
INTRODUCTION
The meaning of the right to vote is among the most contentious,
highly charged questions in all of contemporary law. To a degree
unmatched in other areas, judicial and legislative actions affecting the
right to vote may have immediate and decisive impacts on the nation's public life. Political fortunes may be won or lost and political
power gained or forfeited depending on the resolution of such questions. The Supreme Court's decisions last term invalidating legisla-

tive districts in North Carolina' and Texas, for example, upended at a
stroke residents' settled expectations and threw local politics in those
states into an uproar.3 The Court's recent rejection of state-imposed
term limits for members of Congress4 potentially had even fartherreaching consequences not only for the identity of federal officeholders but for the quality of representation itself.5 Furthermore,
there is nothing like a presidential election campaign to bring home
the extent to which voting rights issues such as party formation, ballot
access and campaign finance bear on the nation's immediate political
future.
Yet the making or breaking of political fortunes is only part of the

t Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; BA. 1980, Yale
University; J.D. 1984, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Jack Chin, Joan
Mahoney, Jay Mootz and Monte Piliawsky for helpful comments and suggestions.
Thanks also to DeanJoan Mahoney and Western New England College School of Law
for financial support, and to Lauren Galliker for research assistance.
I SeeShaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
2 SeeBush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
s See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Voids Race-Based Plansfor Redistricting, N.Y.
TIMES,June 14,1996, atAl.
4 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
5 The Arkansas law struck down in Thornton, for example, stated in its preamble
that "'elected officials who remain in office too long become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the people.'" Id. at 1845 (quoting
ARK. CONST. amend. CXXIII, preamble).
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picture. Many of the most visible contemporary voting rights controversies concern the proper interpretation of the Voting Rights Actespecially whether the Act confers on groups or individuals an affirmative right to representation. These issues make for a particularly
incendiary mix, combining as they do two of the things about which
Americans feel most strongly: democracy and race.
In an area of such significance and volatility one might hope the
courts would be, if not controversial, at least clear. Alas, few areas of
constitutional law are as maddeningly confused and starkly contradictory as the law governing the right to vote. As Justice Harlan once observed, the Court's explanation of the right to vote has been singularly unhelpful. The Court speaks, he complained, "in conclusory
terms of 'debasement' or 'dilution' of the 'voting power' or
,representation' of citizens without explanation of what these con",7
cepts are. The answers are hardly apparent ....
Yet any confusion sown by the Court's failure to speak pales in
comparison to the confusion caused by what it has actually said. In a
contradiction unparalleled in constitutional law, the Court has said
both that the Constitution " [u] ndeniably" protects the right to vote in
state and federal elections" and that the right to vote "is not a constitutionally protected right."" According to the Court, the right to vote
is the most fundamental of rights "because [it is] preservative of all
rights"10 and its abridgment must survive strict scrutiny;" yet the Court
has also insisted that "the Constitution ...does not confer the right
of suffrage upon any one."12 Less contradictory, but equally puzzling,
is the Court's insistence on analyzing voting rights claims under the
Equal Protection Clause when the right to vote in a republic seems a
far better candidate for substantive than for relative forms of analysis.
In addition, the meaning of the Court's revolutionary announcement
in Reynolds v. Sims that the Constitution requires "fair and effective
representation"' 3 remains frustratingly elusive after more than thirty

42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 167 (1971) (Harlan,J., concurring).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964).
' San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd.of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
12 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874); accord Rodriguez
v.
Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9 (1982).
isReynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66.
6
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years.
The degree of public confusion over the content of the right to
vote is reflected in the enormous variety of claims made in its name.
Litigants have claimed that the right to vote requires that the franchise be extended to particular persons"s at particular times; that
certain offices be filled by election; 7 that elected officials represent
equal numbers of people; ' that district lines be drawn in particular
ways; '9that officials be elected from single-member districts;20 that certain candidates be permitted to run for office,2' or that their names be
placed on the ballot;2 that write-in voting be permitted;2 and that the
candidates be listed on the ballot in a certain order. 24 The passage of
the Voting Rights Act, particularly the 1982 amendments,2 expanded
the instances in which the right to vote has been invoked to include
statutory claims that election districts must be drawn to allow certain
groups to control electoral outcomes; 26 that districts be drawn to avoid
certain shapes;27 and that legislators draw district lines according to
some criteria and not others. 8 If these litigation trends have made
14 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme CourtDestabilization of Single-Member Districts,

1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205; Sanford Levinson, Gerrymanderingand the BroodingOmnipresence ofProportionalRepresentation: Why Won't It GoAway?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257 (1985);
Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: PartisanGerqmanderingandJudicialRegulation of
Politics,87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987).
," See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 26-27 (1974) (claiming that rights should
be extended to convicted felons); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
665 (1966) (claiming that the right to vote in state elections may not constitutionally
be conditioned upon the payment of a tax or fee); Lassiter v. Northampton County
Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 45 (1959) (claiming that a state-imposed literacy test is
an unconstitutional prerequisite to the right to vote).
"' See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965).
'7 SeeRodriguez, 457 U.S. 1 (1982); Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
18 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964).
'9 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1980); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960).
20 SeeWhite v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
21 See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
2 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968).
29 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
24 SeeMcLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980).
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
26 SeeThornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
27 SeeShaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
28 See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996);
Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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anything clear, it is that the right to vote has become so indeterminate that every observer may see in it whatever he or she wishes.
Much of the academic literature on the right to vote seems to
share the kind of aimlessness that plagues the dialogue between the
courts and litigants. One recurring problem, for example, is a sometimes myopic focus on voting, and on the Voting Rights Act in particular. Some commentators speak about the Voting Rights Act in
terms so emphatic and sweeping2l as to give the impression that the
Act is some kind of quasi-constitution rather than a statute implementing a single provision of the actual Constitution." As Richard
Briffault recently observed, the Act is sometimes spoken of "not as a
matter of positive law but as a metaphor for a perfected democracy
for minorities."" Yet the significance of the right to vote goes far beyond the issues that arise in the context of statutory rights under the
Voting Rights Act. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court intimating
that the Court may be poised to significantly limit or strike down altogether section 2 of the Voting Rights Act under the Fourteenth
Amendment32 serve as a stark reminder that statutory voting rights are
necessarily built on a much broader constitutional foundation, a
foundation intended to structure the exercise of political influence in
American society.33 All too often overlooked or taken for granted in

2' See,

e.g.,

LANI

GUINIER, THE TYRANNY

OF THE

MAJORITY

69, 72 (1994)

[hereinafter GUINIER, TYRANNY] (stating that the Voting Rights Act should embody
the "transformative vision of politics" of the civil rights movement, and that the Act
"anticipates that... blacks... will produce[] fundamental change in state government" (citation omitted)); Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member
Offices and the VotingRightsAct, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 39 (1991) [hereinafter Karlan, Undoing
the Right Thing] (stating that the Voting Rights Act was designed to "bring about a
radical realignment of political control"); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps andMisreadings: The
Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 173, 237 (1989) [hereinafter Karlan, Maps andMisreadings] (stating that the Voting Rights Act intended to bring about a "reconstruction of society").
" Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment,
using its power under Section 2 of that amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2;
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (upholding numerous provisions of the Voting Rights Act as legitimate exercises of congressional power under
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment).
31 Richard Briffault, Lani Guinierand the Dilemmas ofAmericanDemocracy, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 418, 458 (1995) (reviewing LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY
(1994)).
32 See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816
(1993). But seeBush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (fourJustices willing to assume the
constitutionality ofsection 2).
See Lani Guinier, [EIracingDemocracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV.
109, 113 (1994) [hereinafter Guinier, [Eiracing] (acknowledging that the Voting
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debates over the right to vote is the fact that voting is not an end in
itself but merely a means to an end-the end of implementing democracy.3 We can hardly expect to figure out what voting-or "fair"
voting, 5 or "meaningful" voting'--means without some conception
of what voting is for, what purpose it serves within a larger regime of
democratic self-government. Such a conception can only be supplied
by some theory of democracy itself.
Without this kind of framework, arguments can easily get caught
up in the kind of referenceless circles that often plague the academic
debates about voting rights. One issue of widespread current interest,
for example, is whether the right to vote as manifested in legislative
representation is by nature a group right or an individual right, and
much ink has been spilled attempting to demonstrate one or the
other. Yet there can be no universal truths here: representation is

Rights Act is "a statute in search of a theory" and that neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress has "excavated the principles of democracy in which to locate a group's
statutory right to an effective vote").
See George Kateb, The Moral Distinctiveness of RepresentativeDemocracy, 91 ETHICS
357, 357 (1981) (stating that elections are "the fundamental institutions of representative democracy").
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 104 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(referring to "meaningless" votes).
7 Compare, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and
Redistricting, Drawing ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588 (1993)
(arguing that representation is a group right), Andrea Bierstein, Millennium Approaches: The Future of the Voting Rights Act After Shaw, DeGrandy, and Holder, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1457 (1995) (group right), Guinier, [Eiracing,supra note 33 (group
right), andSamuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869 (1995)
(group right), withJames U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to
City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeeredthe FifteenthAmendment?,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 48 (1982) (arguing that representation is an individual right),
Katherine Inglis Butler, Affirmative RacialGerrymandering:RhetoricandReality, 26 CUMB.
L. REV. 313 (1996) (individual right), Bruce E. Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the Practitioner,Theorist, andReformer, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND
THE COURTS 117 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) (representation is both a group and an
individual right), Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism,
71 TEX. L. REv. 1705 (1993) (arguing that the right to vote actually consists of several
related rights, some individual and some group), and Martin Shapiro, Gesymandering,
Unfairness,and the Supreme Court,33 UCLA L. REv. 227, 232 (1985) (arguing that voting
is an individual right and representation is a group right).
The debate over individual versus group rights has also greatly exercised the
Court. Although the Court has for many years insisted that the right to vote is solely
an individual right, see, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 561 (1964), in its most recent voting rights case, three Justices explicitly argued that the right to vote is a group right in the context of legislative redistricting.
See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (SouterJ., dissenting).
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not a natural category with fixed, identifiable characteristics. Representation is merely a tool, a mechanism, that can be employed in different ways by different political systems to achieve different goals
based on different beliefs about politics and the capabilities of political actors." Without question, debates about the nature of representation and the meaning of voting are a necessary part of the critical
political discourse of any society that has chosen to govern itself
democratically. But to debate the specific features of the political system without attending to the broader context of the political choices
in which those features are located only loses sight of the ultimate issues and obscures the philosophical and conceptual moves made by
the disputants. The result too often is that participants in these debates argue past one another, unable to discern the kind of common
ground that might allow them jointly to advance the discussion.
My purpose in this Article is to take a few small steps toward sorting out this confusing, yet vitally important, area of law by examining
the justifications that underlie the right to vote itself. In so doing, I
hope to lay bare the underlying premises and moves of the parties to
the various voting rights debates by setting these debates in a larger
context. In the pages that follow, I have adopted two reference points
for the examination of voting rights law. First, I examine what voting
rights plaintiffs say. What do they actually mean, I ask, when they
claim that their right to vote has been infringed? Second, I turn to
democratic theory to provide a broader context for the evaluation of
these voting rights claims. As it turns out, most voting rights plaintiffs
rely rather plainly on one of two well-developed theories of democracy: protective democracy, in which voting is understood as the
principal way in which citizens protect their liberties from invasion by
the government; and communitarian democracy, in which voting is
understood as a manifestation of full membership in society. This information is useful in several important ways. It provides an underlying and potentially unifying theory for voting rights claims; it establishes a conceptual framework for analyzing competing contentions
about the right to vote; and it provides some surprising insights into
the Supreme Court's otherwise extremely confusing voting rights jurisprudence.
Part I describes protective democracy and communitarian democracy, the two dominant theories of democracy that run throughout
This point was made vividly 30 years ago in HANNA FENICHEL PIT=IN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
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contemporary voting rights claims. By setting voting rights claims in
the context of the larger democratic theories which they implicitly invoke, I hope to show more clearly the relationship among the various
claims and the ways in which judicial acceptance or rejection of a voting rights claim can provide useful signals about the democratic theory underlying the courts' rulings.
Part II examines a number of Supreme Court decisions concerning the right to vote in an effort to determine what theory of democracy the Court might be employing. This analysis yields the surprising conclusion that the Court, which habitually speaks about the vote
almost exclusively in terms of its liberty-protective properties, has
been for the most part distinctly hostile to voting rights claims based
on theories of protective democracy. Paradoxically, the Court has
been receptive primarily to voting rights claims resting on communitarian grounds. Part II then relies on this insight to offer an explanation for the Court's recently expressed hostility to section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.
Part III sets out some possible explanations for the Court's preference for communitarian-based voting rights claims. I argue, in
brief, that the Court dislikes protective democracy-based claims because such claims necessarily force it to decide precisely what political
structures the Constitution creates for the effectuation of political influence, something the Court is loath to decide. One reason the
Court may wish to avoid these questions is because the answers are
likely to be unsatisfactory to contemporary Americans; an unpleasant
truth about the Constitution is that it provides scant protection indeed for rights of political influence, including the right to vote.
Communitarian-based theories, on the other hand, offer the
Court a way out of this bind because such theories allow it to rely on
he mediating concept of tradition. American democratic traditions
turn out to be far more rights-protective than the Constitution itself
when it comes to rights of political influence. Paradoxically, this divergence allows a basically conservative Court to turn to tradition, not
to defeat claims of political right, but to reward them. Part III also
examines the ways in which the Court has used equal protection doctrine as a vehicle for asserting what amounts to a substantive theory of
communitarian democracy.
Finally, Part IV focuses on the contemporary debate over the existence of a constitutional or statutory right to representation and asks,
in light of the pertinent theories of democracy and the Court's voting
rights jurisprudence, whether it is possible to construct a plausible

900

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 145:893

right-to-representation claim that might survive judicial review.

I

conclude that such a claim contains significant weaknesses that would
make its acceptance by the Court unlikely.
I. VOTING IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Voting has no intrinsic value. It is not uncommon in some autocratic states for the government to hold elections in which the only
candidate on the ballot is the incumbent autocrat.39 The rulers then
use the results to defend the political legitimacy of the regime. People living in these countries might well be excused for thinking that
such a vote is worthless, or worse. This practice reveals starkly that
the value of a vote arises from the political and social context in
which it occurs.
What then is the value of voting in oursociety? An extensive body
of voting rights law is devoted to the proposition that the denial of
the vote-or the denial of an "effective" Vote40--is presumptively
bad.4 ' But why? What exactly is so important about the right to vote
that its denial, or the perception of its denial, is so offensive? One
way to begin answering this question is by going to the source: the
voting rights litigants themselves. Why do they say that voting is so
important to them, and just what do they mean when they claim that
their right to vote has been infringed?
A detailed review of voting rights claims and judicial responses is
deferred until Part II. For now, it is sufficient to observe that over the
entire range of cases involving the right to vote in all its manifestations, American voting rights plaintiffs have almost universally made
only two kinds of claims to support the contention that their right to
vote has been impaired. The first claim is that exclusion in some
form or another from the franchise leaves them with an inadequate
ability to influence the outcomes of governmental decisionmaking
processes. 42 That is, their inability to vote, or to vote effectively, leaves

39 The most recent such "election" to make the news was the Iraqi people's overwhelming vote of confidence in Saddam Hussein. See No Surprise in Iraqi Vote; N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at A10.
40 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (referring to "effective"
participation and "effective" representation).
" This presumption is often manifested in the application of strict scrutiny to denials of the right to vote. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621
(1969).
42 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 75 (1978); Fortson v. Morris,
385 U.S. 231 (1966); Salyer Land Co.v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
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them politically naked and at the mercy of processes over which they
exercise no control. The second claim, by no means incompatible
with the first and sometimes asserted simultaneously, is that the denial of the right to vote constitutes an unacceptable form of exclusion
from a validating social practice. Exclusion from voting is, in effect, a
mark of inferiority,
a consignment to a degrading form of second43
class citizenship.
Of course, to identify the harm that voting rights plaintiffs claim
to have suffered is only the beginning; we still need some justification
for viewing these harms as legally cognizable. Because litigants are
often better at describing their injuries than supplying justifications
for redressing them, this is a proper point at which to turn for assistance to democratic theory.
Western political thought is well-stocked with diverse theories of
democracy, 44 and we need not search long to find a good fit. For reasons that will soon become apparent, the harms identified above correspond quite well to two kinds of venerable democratic theories: theories of "protective democracy," and theories of what I will
call "communitarian democracy."45 In theories of protective democU.S. 719, 724 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 129 (1971); and discussion
infra Part II.
43 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 533; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); discussion infraPart II.
For a good overview, see DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987).
' There are, of course, many other different theories of democracy that have
played a prominent role in the development of democratic thought. For example, a
third historically important theory is what C.B. Macpherson calls "developmental democracy." This theory holds that democracy isjustified primarily by its effect on the
citizenry- active participation in a democratic polity is said to create informed, politically aware and public-spirited citizens. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 47-48, 50-52 (1977). This theory has probably found its most influential modem expression in the writings of John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART
MILL, Considerationson Representative Government, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 205,
303-24 (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 1991).
A more recently developed democratic theory that has received extensive attention in the legal literature is deliberative democracy, a civic republican-inspired theory
that stresses open, ethical dialogue as the defining feature of a good polity. See, e.g.,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); David M. Estlund, Whos Afraid
ofDeliberativeDemocracy? On the Strategic/DeliberativeDichotomy in Recent ConstitutionalJurisprudenc4 71 TEX. L. REV. 1437 (1993); Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-OrientedLegal Theory and the MoralFoundation ofDeliberativeDemocracy,
82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994).
Although a few voting rights theorists have occasionally made arguments that seem
to invoke a conception of developmental or deliberative democracy, see, e.g., Kathryn
Abrams, "RaisingPolitics Up"."Minority PoliticalParticipationand Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 476-479 (1988) (discussing personal benefits of po44
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racy, voting is significant because it is the means by which members of
society protect their liberties from invasion by government. In theories of communitarian democracy, voting is significant because it is
the hallmark of full membership in the political community.4
A. ProtectiveDemocracy
Protective democracy 47 is the theory of democracy most closely as-

sociated with liberalism, and with liberal thinkers such as Locke,
Montesquieu and Madison. Under theories of protective democracy,
the vote is valuable because it is the means by which members of society control the actions of their government-specifically, those actions that might threaten the liberties of the citizens.
Protective democracy is rooted in the Lockean idea, transmitted
to Americans by way of the Declaration of Independence, that indi-

litical participation); Lani Guinier, MoreDemocray,1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 1 (hinting
at aspects of deliberative democracy), I can find no evidence that any litiganthas ever
supported a claim of infringement of the legal right to vote on such grounds. That is,
no litigants appear to have come before the Court and argued, for example, that they
cannot be denied the right to cast a ballot because doing so impairs their ability to develop their human capacities or deprives them of the opportunity to engage in dialogue. Nor has any court to my knowledge said anything even remotely suggesting
acceptance, or even awareness, of these kinds of theories.
A very different view is taken by Frank Michelman, who has argued that the Supreme Court's voting rights cases express, or at least do not exclude, an underlying
judicial conception of deliberative democracy. See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of
Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: VotingRights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989).

I find his readings of the cases distinctly unpersuasive. Some of the reasons for my
skepticism can be found in James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critiqueof Deliberative
Democracyand the Life of Talk 63 TENN. L. REV. 421 (1996).

"'The distinction between protective and communitarian democracy relied on
here is certainly not original. Numerous others have noted this duality, though their
See, e.g., QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE
terminology has often been different.
SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS AT 1965-1990, at 15-16 [hereinafter

QUIET REVOLUTION] (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (referring
to the ability of voting rights both to obtain "policy benefits to the minority communities" and "to confer full citizenship on the members of the group"); Karlan, Undoing
the Right Thing, supra note 29, at 5-6 (describing "formal" and "functional" aspects of
the right to vote); Karlan, Maps andMisreadings,supra note 29, at 213-15 (describing
the Voting Rights Act as aimed both at the political influence that comes with representation and the symbolic value of civic inclusion); Milton D. Morris, Black Electoral
Participationand the Distributionof PublicBenefits, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 271, 271

(Chandler Davidson ed., 1989) (describing black political participation as influencing
the actions of government and having symbolic importance).
17 Although the term is C.B. Macpherson's, see MACPHERSON,
supra note 45, I follow more closely here the usage suggested by David Held. SeeHELD, supranote 44.
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viduals have certain inalienable rights, 4 and that these rights can be
better protected jointly, in a society living under the consensual rule
of a government, than individually." The transfer of power to a government, even consensually, always entails some risk: governments
are run by people, and people can abuse their powers. Choosing officeholders by election is thus a means of assuring that the government exercises its powers consistent with the popular will."° As C.B.
Macpherson put it, in a protective democracy, "the extent of the franchise is a measure of democratic government only in so far as the exercise of the franchise can make and unmake governments."5
A voting rights claim under a theory of protective democracy,
then, is a claim that one's ability to protect one's liberties from governmental intrusion is inadequate. Consequently, to seek the vote
under such a theory is to seek the ability to protect one's liberty by
controlling the identity of officeholders and, indirectly, their actions.
Much language in the Supreme Court's voting rights opinions is
highly suggestive of an underlying theory of protective democracy.
For example, the Court has maintained continuously for over a century that the right to vote is a fundamental right "because [it is] preservative of all rights."5 2 What the Court seems to mean by this phrase
is that direct constitutional protection of substantive rights can go
only so far toward protecting the rights and liberties of citizens because the constitutional protection of rights depends for its efficacy
on observance of the Constitution by government officials. The right
to vote differs from other substantive rights in that it permits the
people directly to protect their substantive rights by replacing officials
who refuse to observe those rights.
B. CommunitarianDemocracy

Communitarian theories of democracy are in some sense the
most elemental of democratic theories: they respond primarily to the
visceral human need for inclusion. One of the earliest and most roDECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
"' See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
48

1980) (1690), §§ 4, 87, 89, 95-99.
o See, e.g., HELD, supranote 44, at 61 ("[T]he governors must be held accountable
to the governed through political mechanisms... which give citizens satisfactory
means for choosing, authorizing and controlling political decisions.").
MACPHERSON, supra note 45, at 23.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); accordReynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562 (1964).
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mantic expressions of the communitarianism ofAmerican democracy
can be found in the poetry of Walt Whitman. In Whitman's vision,
exclusion from the electoral process is exclusion in the deepest possible sense from the essence of American society. American democracy, Whitman claims, is the pinnacle of American achievement,
dwarfing even the most magnificent of natural wonders:
If I should need to name, 0 Western World, your
powerfulest scene and show,
'Twould not be you, Niagara-nor you, ye limitless
prairies-nor your huge rifts of canyons, Colorado,
Nor you, Yosemite-nor Yellowstone, with all its spasmic
geyser loops ascending to the skies, appearing and
disappearing,
Nor Oregon's white cones-nor Huron's belt of mighty lakes
-nor Mississippi's stream:
-This seething hemisphere's humanity, as now, I'd namethe stillsmall voice vibrating-America's choosing
day,
(The heart of it not in the chosen-the act itself the
main, the quadriennial choosing,) ...
The final ballot-shower from East to West-the paradox and
conflict,
The countless snow-flakes falling-(a swordless conflict,
Yet more than all Rome's wars of old, or modern Napoleon's:)
the peaceful choice of all...
These stormy gusts and winds waft precious ships,
Swell'd Washington's, Jefferson's, Lincoln's sails.,5

To be excluded from the vote is, according to this view, to be excluded from the most important and impressive activity in which
Americans can engage. Yet it is more than that. Whitman ardently
espoused an organic relationship between the concept of America, its
physical characteristics, and the individuals who peopled it; America,
for Whitman, was its people made immanent:
O I see flashing that this America is only you and me,
Its power, weapons, testimony, are you and me,
Its crimes, lies, thefts, defections, are you and me,
Its Congress is you and me, the officers, capitols, armies,
ships, are you and me,
Its endless gestations of new States are you and me.

5 WALT WHITMAN, Election Day, November, 1884, in LEAVES OF GRASS 517 (Harold
W. Blodgett &Sculley Bradley eds., 1965).
WALT WHITMAN, By Blue Ontario'sShore, in LEAVES OF GRASS, supra note 53, at
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Yet this relationship also flows in the other direction; not only is
America its people, but its people are America:
I match my spirit against yours you orbs, growths,
mountains, brutes,
Copious as you are I absorb you all in myself, and become
the master myself,
America isolated yet embodying all, what is it finally
except myself?
These States, what are they except myself?

If America and its people commune immanently in one another,
and if voting is the most significant and defining achievement of
American society, then those who are denied the vote are denied
much more than the opportunity to participate in the democratic
process: they are denied the transcendental possibility of becoming a
part of America-indeed, of becoming America itself. No form of social alienation could be more complete, and it is doubtless no coincidence that Whitman describes the fate of the disenfranchised American in terms that resemble those used to describe the fate of the
Christian denied communion with God.
A far less romantic, but equally powerful, account of a communitarian theory of democracy appears in Judith Shklar's short book,
Citizenship in America.s ' For Shklar, the key to understanding American attitudes toward voting lies, paradoxically, in understanding the
American experience with slavery. Voting, she argues, stands in such
stark contrast to slavery that "[t]he ballot has always been a certificate
of full membership in society," an indicator of "social standing" that
has the "capacity to confer a minimum ofsocial dignity" on those who
have itY
In Shklar's view, a demand for the vote indicates not "an aspiration to civic participation as a deeply involving activity," but rather "a
demand for inclusion in the polity, an effort to break down excluding
barriers to recognition."" Historically, voting thus became "an affirmation of belonging,""' as well as a means of "distancing the citizen
from his inferior, especially slaves and women. " o Voting, then, is
55Id. at 354.
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, CMZENSHIP INAMERICA: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION (1991).

"Id. at 2.
"

Id. at 3.

"Id. at 26 (citing KIM EZRA
10 (1984)).
'o Id. at 27.

SCHIENBAUM, BEYOND THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
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something to be had rather than something to be done. To seek the
vote is to seek formal recognition as a full member of society; to be
denied the vote is to be either excluded altogether from membership
in the6 community or consigned to some kind of second-class citizenship. 1

II. THE COURT'S PREFERENCE FOR COMMUNITARIAN-BASED CLAIMS
Over the years, plaintiffs have asserted many varieties of voting
rights claims based, sometimes explicitly though more often implicitly, on underlying theories of protective or communitarian democracy. The protective democracy approach seems especially appealing
because it relies on a political theory strongly embraced by the nation's founding generation, and because it uses a vocabulary that is
deeply embedded in American constitutional law. 62 These factors
might lead us to expect the Court to be particularly receptive to
claims based on notions of protective democracy.
Examination of the Court's language seems to bear out this expectation. The Court has characterized the right to vote as
"preservative of other basic civil and political rights; " "' it has identified
"fair and effective representation" as a primary goal of the Constitution's political structure; and it has condemned the "debasement" or
"dilution" of the value of the vote through practices that diminish the
1 This account of communitarian democracy corresponds well with what Karlan
has called the "formal" aspect ofvoting. See Karlan, Undoingthe Right Thing, supra note
29, at 5 (asserting that the "formal" importance of voting is how it "announces that the
voter is a full member of the political community"); see also KENNETH L. KARST,
BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 93 (1989)
("Voting is notjust an instrument for achieving power... ; it is an assertion of belonging to a political community."); QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 46, at 16 (stating that
voting rights "confer full citizenship on the members of the [minority] group"); Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money But by Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System,
80 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1465 (1994) (describing the benefits of voting in "expressive"
terms, especially for historically disadvantaged groups, as "away of declaring one's full
membership in the political community").
62 The opinions of ChiefJustice John Marshall are fairly canonical accounts of the
protective democracy theory, particularly his opinion in McCullochv. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (account of the Constitution as formed by the people as well as
an account of the enumerated powers and electoral checks). See alsoJames A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: ImplementingPopularSovereignty Under the Lockean
Constitution,52 U. PITT. L. REv. 189, 205-211 (1990) (setting out evidence of the Constitution's adoption of the Lockean theory of protective democracy).
0 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); accordYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886).
rA Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
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influence of its possessor.r This is, plainly, the vocabulary of protective democracy.
Yet, although it routinely speaks the language of protective democracy, the Court has proven surprisingly hostile to voting rights
claims invoking that theory. In fact, plaintiffs who challenge an electoral structure on the ground that it leaves them with an inadequate
ability to protect their rights and interests from majority tyranny are
overwhelmingly likely to be shown the courthouse door. In sharp
contrast, the plaintiffs most likely to meet with success as Supreme
Court litigants are those who base their claims on communitarian
theories-those who complain, that is, of being stigmatized by some
demeaning form of exclusion from the community's political life.
This Part examines a number of Supreme Court decisions dealing
with a wide range of voting rights issues, paying particular attention to
the nature of the plaintiffs' claims, and their judicial reception. Section A deals with voting rights claims brought by plaintiffs who entirely lack the vote. r' Sections B and C deal with voting rights claims
brought by plaintiffs who already have the franchise, but who claim
that the right to vote involves something more. Section B examines
the one-person, one-vote cases, while Section C covers claims to a
right to representation. Finally, Section D relies on the patterns identified in the previous Sections to offer an explanation for the Court's
sudden, newfound hostility toward section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
I argue that the problem with section 2 as amended in 1982, is its implementation of a protective democracy solution to a problem that
the Court has deemed communitarian.
A. Right to Vote Claims Without the Vote: The Right to the Franchise
1. Introduction: Holt
Let us begin our examination of the Court's voting rights decisions by considering what ought to be an easy case. In Holt Civic Club
v. City of Tuscaloosa,67 residents of Holt, Alabama, a suburb of Tuscaloosa, brought suit to invalidate an Alabama statute that subjected
Holt to Tuscaloosa's "police and sanitary" regulations without providing Holt's residents with any voice in the selection of Tuscaloosa muId. at 555; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118 (1986).
Such claims are sometimes referred to as "first-generation" voting rights claims.
See GUINIER, TVRANNY, supranote 29, at 49; QUIET REVOLUTION, supranote 46, at 14.
6 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
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nicipal officials.& Like other Alabama cities, Tuscaloosa was authorized by state law to adopt a wide variety of ordinances governing many
aspects of city life. The challenged law authorized Tuscaloosa to enforce some, though not all, city ordinances within a "police jurisdiction" extending three miles beyond the city's borders, an area which
included the town of Holt.6 At the time of the suit, these ordinances,
among other things, governed the granting of licenses for hotels, florists, and ambulances; established building permit and inspection requirements; regulated several aspects of public health; established
motor vehicle inspection and operation requirements; and created
over a dozen criminal offenses." However, the challenged statute did
not provide for residents of the extended police jurisdiction to vote
for any of the Tuscaloosa officials who made, administered and enforced these laws.
A group of Holt residents filed suit challenging the law on the
ground that it unconstitutionally denied residents of the "police jurisdiction" the right to vote.7 ' The United States Supreme Court
made short work of this contention: the Court ruled that Tuscaloosa
could constitutionally deny the plaintiffs the right to vote in Tuscaloosa elections because the plaintiffs lived in Holt, not Tuscaloosa.7
Just what did the plaintiffs in Holt mean when they claimed that
their exclusion from Tuscaloosa elections violated their right to vote?
To begin with, it hardly seems likely that the plaintiffs intended to
rely on a communitarian theory of democracy. Surely, they were not
complaining about some kind of wrongful exclusion from the Tuscaloosa political community; as suburbanites, the plaintiffs had deliberately rejected membership in the Tuscaloosa community in favor of
a separate, suburban political community. They did not seek annexation by Tuscaloosa, or any other form of inclusion; if anything, they
wanted to be free of Tuscaloosa entirely.
Instead, the basis of the plaintiffs' invocation of the right to vote is
an almost paradigmatic expression of a theory of protective democracy. The plaintiffs did not contend that the police jurisdiction of
's

See id. at 61-62.
See id. at 61.

70 See id. at 82-84 n.10 (Brennan,J., dissenting).

In the Court's words, the plaintiffs "claimed that the city's extraterritorial exercise of police powers over Holt residents, without a concomitant extension of the franchise on an equal footing with those residing within the corporate limits, denies residents of the police jurisdiction rights secured by the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses." Id. at 62-63.
7 See id. at 68-70.
7
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Tuscaloosa could not be extended beyond its boundaries, but that it
could not be so extended without a concomitant extension of the
franchise. The plaintiffs wanted to be able to vote in Tuscaloosa elections so that they would have "a voice in their government."
In
other words, they did not want to be subjected to laws enacted by representatives whom they had no hand in choosing and over whom they
exercised no effective control.
The Holt residents' claim is instantly recognizable as one of the
most venerable and powerful in the entire tradition of American history and politics: a claim of the inadequacy of virtual representation.
The doctrine of virtual representation arose in the eighteenth century
as a defense to the haphazardness of the British system of allocating
representatives to Parliament, a system in which the great majority of
British subjects were not entitled to vote.7 4 Those unable to vote directly for parliamentary representatives were said, nonetheless, to be
represented "virtually" because their interests would necessarily be
taken into account by a Parliament engaged in the deliberative process of identifying and pursuing the common good of the entire commonwealth.7 5
When this doctrine was invoked to justify the disenfranchisement
of the American colonists, it "met at once with flat and universal rejection, ultimately with derision. " 76 Americans argued that no member of Parliament could possibly represent them adequately because
of a significant divergence between the interests of the mother country and its colonies." In one well-known capsulization of the American view, Arthur Lee wrote: "'[although o] ur privileges are all virtual,
our sufferings are reaL ... We might have flattered ourselves, that a

virtual obedience,would have exactly corresponded with a virtual representation ... .,,78 This view ultimately evolved into the belief that rep-

3 Id. at 80 (quoting appellants' complaint).
7' See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

163 (1967).
Id.; see also PrIN,supranote 38, at 168-89 (discussing Edmund Burke's concept
of representing unattached interests); J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN
ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 443-44 (1966) (discussing the
doctrine of interest representation); JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 50-62 (1989) (discussing the
theories of interest and virtual representation).
76 BAILYN, supra note 74, at
167.
See id at 167-68; REID, supranote 75, at 59-60; cf. PITKIN, supranote 38, at 173-75.
78 BAILYN, supra note 74, at 168 (quoting Arthur Lee, Monitor II, VIRGINIA GAzETTE,Mar. 10, 1768).
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resentative government is legitimate only when those supposedly represented have had some direct say in the selection of the representatives.
In light of this history, no claim, it seems, could be more certain
of a generous constitutional reception than the claim that virtual representation provides inadequate protection for the rights and liberties
of citizens denied the vote. Yet the Court, surprisingly, was deaf to
the Holt plaintiffs' protective democracy claim. Rather than responding to the protective claim on its merits, the Court issued a distinctly
communitarian response: you are not members of the community,
the Court said, so you have no legitimate claim to participate in the
affairs of the community-you have no right to vote there.
The Court articulated its position as follows. Holt residents, it
held, had no right to participate in Tuscaloosa elections because they
were not members of the relevant political community: "our cases
have uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately
restrict the right to participate in its political process to those who reside within its borders."0 It may well be, the Court continued, that
the actions of Tuscaloosa affect Holt residents, but that "proves too
much. The imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits cannot
corral the influence of municipal actions. A city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders."8 The
Court then listed a few such decisions, including the granting of
building permits on the city's fringe, changes in the city's sales or ad
valorem taxes, and the construction of waste facilities near municipal
borders.8 2
The Court's reasoning entirely-missed the point of the plaintiffs'
claim. The plaintiffs were not trying to minimize the fact that they
lived in a different community-that was precisely their point. The
problem, in their view, was that they were governed by a political
community different from the one to which they belonged. As Justice
Brennan wrote in dissent
At the heart of our basic conception of a "political community" . . . is
the notion of a reciprocal relationship between the process of government and those who subject themselves to that process by choosing to
live within the area of its authoritative application. Statutes such as
those challenged in this case ... fracture this relationship by severing

See id. at 173-74.
8 Holt, 439 U.S. at 68-69.
8'Id. at 69.
82 See id.
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the connection between the process of government and those who are
83
governed in the places of their residency ....

While the Court was correct that the actions of one jurisdiction
inevitably have some kind of "spillover" effect on neighboring jurisdictions, there is a significant difference between living with neighbors and living underthose neighbors-the difference between comity
under independent self-government and outright political subjection.
One would think that in a nation whose political origins lie in an intellectual rejection of virtual representation, this difference would
resonate with judges interpreting the Constitution. The Court, however, did not even hear the protective democracy claim.
2. KramerandGomillion
The Court's ruling in Kramerv. Union Free School District No. J58 4
provides a stark contrast to the ruling in Holt. Kramerconcerned the
constitutionality of a New York law setting voting qualifications in local school board elections. School boards in New York are responsible for operating the schools, prescribing curricula, and financing the
school budgets through property taxes.s Under the challenged law,
qualified voters in school board elections were limited to parents or
guardians of children enrolled in the local public schools, and anyone who owned or leased taxable property within the district.8r The
state's purpose in enacting the law was to limit the franchise to those
with the most direct stake in school board decisions: those whose
children actually attended local schools, and those who paid school
taxes. The plaintiff, a childless adult who lived rent free in his parents' home, challenged his exclusion from the voting rolls& The
Court struck down the law.89
Compared to the plaintiffs in Holt, the, plaintiff in Kramer had a
far less plausible claim that his inability to vote impaired in any sig"sId.at 82 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
" See id. at 623-24.
See id. at 622 (explaining § 2012 of the NewYork Education Law).
s7See id. at 630-31. For a variety of accounts of the constitutionally pertinent interest, see Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 355-56 (1993); Michelman, supra note 45, at 463-64;
Melvyn R. Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt: Reappraisingthe Right to Vote in Terms ofPolitical "Interest"and Vote Dilution,33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1982).
8 See Kramer,395 U.S. at 624-25.
9See

id.at 633.
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nificant way his ability to protect his rights and liberties from government infringement. The residents of Holt were subject to all
manner of laws, including criminal and traffic offenses, made by Tuscaloosa officials. Holt residents who wanted to obtain a license, build
a home, or drive on the streets had to obey laws enacted by officials
for whom they did not vote." The statute in Kramer,in contrast, was
designed in large part to avoid such a situation: school board decisions primarily affect schoolchildren and property taxes, and those
whose children or pocketbooks were implicated had the vote, enabling them to protect their interests against potential government intrusions. As a result, any claim by Kramer based on a theory of protective democracy would have had to rely on a far more attenuated
connection between the actions of the school board and the plaintiff's rights and interests than existed in Holt. In fact, Kramer did offer such an argument, contending that local tax rates affected "the
price of goods
and services in the community"9-a remote relation2
ship, at best.9

While it is perhaps not inconceivable that such a protective democracy claim might rise to constitutional significance, Kramer's voting-rights claim fits far more comfortably within a communitarian
theory of democracy. What really bothered the plaintiff, it seems, was
the fact of his exclusion, not the result of it. "All members of the
community," he flatly asserted, "have an interest in the quality and
structure of public education." 9 Nor was there any evidence that the
plaintiff or any other excluded individuals had ever actually been
harmed by a decision of a school board. Under the circumstances,
the interest claimed by the plaintiff seems to arise less in virtue of any
impact on actual individuals like him than in virtue of community
membership itself; the interest, in other words, is definitional-it defines who is and who is not a member of the community.9 4 In any

90 For a sample of the Tuscaloosa laws to which Holt residents were subjected,
see
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 82 n.10 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9'Kramer,395 U.S. at 630.
2 The Court recently rejected a strikingly similar chain of effects as insufficient to
sustain the exercise of the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. See
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1659-62 (1995) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
93 Kramer,395 U.S. at 630.
Cf Sanford Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?, 41 RA. L. REV.
545, 555-57 (1989) (criticizing formal definitions of citizenship); Briffault, supra note
87, at 345, 350, 355-56 (arguing that the Court simply assumes sufficiency of the interest).
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event, the Court proved highly receptive to the plaintiffs claim. At
one point in the opinion, the Court listed several other classes of
people disenfranchised by the New York law, including "senior citizens ...; clergy, military personnel, and others who live on taxexempt property; boarders and lodgers," parents of preschoolers, and
parents of children who attend private school.' This litany seems calculated to emphasize the exclusionary character of the law; the Court
does not seem to be saying "here is a list of people whose liberty may
be imperiled," but rather "here is a list of valued community members
who are barred from participating in this important event."
The contrast with Holt is instructive. Both Kramer and the Holt
residents were represented only virtually on the pertinent municipal
councils because they could not vote. Moreover, the school board
had much less power to harm Kramer than Tuscaloosa had to harm
the citizens of Holt. The Holt residents, however, by living in the
suburbs, had voluntarily excluded themselves from the municipal political community and thus were confined to basing their voting-rights
claim on the need to protect their interests from infringement by a
government in which they were unrepresented. Kramer, in contrast,
lived by choice within the pertinent political community ' but was excluded involuntarily from its electoral processes. This gave his claim
a communitarian character that apparently contributed to the different result.
0
7
Gomillion v. Lightfoo
has much in common with Kramer. Gomillion involved a challenge by black voters to a law that redrew the
boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama. ' 8 Before the challenged law was
enacted, the city of Tuskegee formed a square within which black
residents outnumbered white residents by about four to one.10 The
challenged law contracted the city boundaries into an odd, twentyeight-sided figure that excluded from the redrawn city limits all but a

o Kramer,395 U.S. at 630.

There is of course a definitional problem lurking here: what exactly is the pertinent political community? Kramer claimed that it was the community defined by the
geographical reach of school board authority, while New York claimed that it was the
nongeographical community of parents and taxpayers. The Court, without explanation, chose Kramer's definition. For commentary on this aspect of the case, see
sources cited supranote 94.
97 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
See id.at 340.
See BERNARD TAPER,
RYMNANDER CASE 11 (1962).

GOMILLION vERSUS

LIGHTFOOT: THE TUSKEGEE GER-
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handful of black families.0'0 Virtually all of the former Tuskegee's
black residents suddenly found themselves living in an unincorporated part of Macon County.' °' Although these individuals could still
vote, as they had before, for federal, state and county officials, they
could no longer vote for Tuskegee officials because they no longer
' °2 The Court invalidated the redistricting. 10
lived in the city.
What kind of voting-rights claim did the Gomillion plaintiffs advance? As in Kramer,it seems implausible that the plaintiffs relied on
a theory of protective democracy. Under such a theory, people need
the vote to enable them to control government officials who have the
power to invade their liberties.' 4 Yet the blacks districted out of Tuskegee had just this power: like other residents of unincorporated
parts of Macon County, they could vote for every official at every level,
whether federal, state or county, who had legal authority over them.
Although they could no longer vote for Tuskegee officials, neither
were they governed by Tuskegee, unlike the plaintiffs in Holt. The
Gomillion plaintiffs thus enjoyed, as much as anyone else in Alabama,
the ability to use the ballot to protect their interests. ' 05

Clearly, the offense of which the Gomillion plaintiffs complained
was one against their sense of community. The plaintiffs had lived
within the Tuskegee political community and had measured their
status within that community in part by their ability, at least in the-

0 See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
" SeeTAPER, supranote 99, at 85.
102 See id.
103
101
103

See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 348.
See discussion supra, Part IA
At least, this appears to be the case according to the Court's sketchy account of

the facts. Other facts not relied on by the Court paint a somewhat different picture.
Blacks also outnumbered whites in Macon County by about four to one, but because of
racial discrimination by county officials in voter registration, may have faced significant obstacles to protecting their interests in county elections. Many blacks in Tuskegee were associated with the Tuskegee Institute and were not only qualified voters
but had advanced degrees and were far more literate than most of the town's white
citizens. Alabama officials might have thought that it would be difficult ultimately to
deny registration to such voters, in which case dispersing them in Macon County
might have weakened their voting influence far more than if they had been concentrated in the small town of Tuskegee. See TAPER, supra note 99, at 11, 13-14, 34-35; see
also United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961) (awarding the United
States injunctive relief against state and county registrars under the Civil Rights Act of
1957 for defendants' deliberate discriminatory denial of registration). Nothing in the
Court's opinion however, suggests that it relied on or even knew of these additional
facts.
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ory,'' to vote there. Like Kramer, Tuskegee's black citizens had been
excluded from full membership in the community by being disenfranchised; unlike the residents of Holt, this exclusion was involuntary, and thus all the worse in the Court's view.
3. Other Cases
Many other disenfranchisement cases reveal the same
trend: voting-rights claims based on protective democracy fare
poorly, while those based on communitarian considerations fare better. For example, the United States Supreme Court has three times
considered and rejected claims that the right to vote requires that certain appointive offices be filled by election. In Fortson v. Morris,'°7 the
Court sustained a section of the Georgia Constitution providing for
selection of the Governor by the state legislature if no candidate obtained a majority in a popular gubernatorial election. In Valenti v.
Rockefelle °s and Rodriguez v. PopularDemocraticParty,'13 the Court sustained state practices of filling legislative vacancies by, respectively,
gubernatorial and party appointment, rather than by popular election.
A claim that a particular office should be filled by election rather
than by appointment is unlikely to rest on a communitarian theory of
democracy. Since no one votes for that office, no individual's status
within the community is implicated by the structural decision to appoint rather than elect. On the other hand, there is a clear protective
democracy rationale behind the claim that offices must be filled by
election: those who make such claims seem to be saying that their
rights and liberties cannot be adequately secured through indirect
control over the appointing official or body; the requisite degree of
protection can be obtained only through direct election of the official
in question."0 The Court has rejected such claims in all three cases in
" In fact, Tuskegee officials discriminated against the town's black citizens in

voter registration, so it is unclear that they would have been able successfully to register at the time of the suit. See TAPER, supra note 99, at 34-36. If Gomillion and his coplaintiffs relied on a communitarian theory of democracy, then they were relying on a
vision of their community that was far from fully realized.
107 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
393 U.S. 405 (1969).
457 U.S. 1 (1982).
11o See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Reflections on Appointive Local Government Bodies and a
Right to an Election, 11 DUQ. L. REV. 119 (1972). A similar assumption seems to be at
work in the state constitutional reform movement of the Progressive era, in which

many formerly appointive offices were made elective to improve popular control over
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which they have been advanced.
The Court rejected another protective democracy claim in Salyer
Land Co. v. TulareLake Basin Water StorageDistrict."I ' There, the plaintiffs challenged the electoral structure of a limited-purpose government district with responsibility for water storage and flood control in
a rural, agricultural area of California. Eligibility to vote for the District's board of directors was limited to landowners within its jurisdiction, and votes were allocated in proportion to land holdings. The
plaintiffs proceeded on a rather straightforward protective democracy
claim: they argued that their disenfranchisement left them without a
voice on, and thus entirely at the mercy of, the Water District.
Moreover, in contrast to Kramer1 or Holt,"3 the plaintiffs in Salyerhad
already suffered significant harm at the District's hands: as a result of
the District's water control decisions,
a plaintiff's home had been
4
submerged under 15.5 feet of water."
Although it is difficult to imagine a more appealing protective
democracy claim, including as it does a vivid example of the complete
failure of virtual representation, the Court was unimpressed. As in
Holt, the Court answered a protective democracy claim with a communitarian response. The relevant community, the Court said, consists of landowners, and you are not landowners; therefore you have
no claim to the franchise." 5 Evidently, the plaintiffs' efforts would
have been better directed toward showing why their exclusion from
the political
community of landowners was inappropriate or demean6
ing.''
The residency requirement cases illustrate a point that the Salyer
plaintiffs would have done well to heed: voting rights claims that can
be supported by either a protective or communitarian theory seem to
be most successful when couched in a way that appeals to communi-

state government. See C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL
INTENT AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT ch.3 (1995) (discussing the history of state
governments and democratic reform).
"' 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
,1 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
"4 Salyer,410 U.S. at 737-38 (Douglas,J, dissenting).
"' See id-at 728-33.
"6 This might have been a difficult argument to make. As Richard Briffault observed, the area's sparse population and lack of amenities showed "not an absence of
governmental power for the district's governing board but the lack of a community
within the district appropriate for self-government." Briffault, supra note 87, at 363-64.
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tarian values. In Carringtonv. Rash,' 7 for example, the Court examined a Texas constitutional provision that prohibited extension of the
franchise in state and local elections to members of the United States
armed forces. A voting rights challenge to such an exclusion could
rest on either protective or communitarian grounds. From a protective perspective, members of the armed forces could argue that they
were subject to many state and local laws when serving in the armed
forces and needed the ability to protect themselves through the franchise from the possibility of unjust and harmful legislation. From a
communitarian perspective, the plaintiffs could argue that they were
members of the state and local communities notwithstanding their
military service and were entitled to full-fledged community membership, including the right to vote.
In striking down the Texas provision, the Court rested decisively
on communitarian considerations. There is no hint that the Court
was at all concerned with the plaintiffs' inability to influence the content of state and local laws that might affect them."" Instead, what the
Court found objectionable was the state's disenfranchisement of people who were "bona fide residents"--members of the political community-of Texas localities." 9 Apparently, the Court was particularly
offended by the notion that the military uniform, an affirmation of
communal membership if ever there was one, should be converted
into "'the ' badge of disenfranchisement for the man or woman who
wears it., 2
B. Voting Rights Claims with the Vote: The One-Person, One-Vote Cases

At this point, I want to deal with a possibly significant counterexample to the trend identified thus far: the one-person, one-vote
cases. In this extensive and highly influential line of cases,1 the
n1380 U.S. 89 (1965).
318 In contrast, this was of considerable concern to Texas. One of its justifications
for the disenfranchisement was the fear that the residents of a military base would possess an electoral influence that could "overwhelm a small local civilian community."

Id. at 93.
" Id. at 94.
'20 Id. at 97 (quoting Governor Ellis Arnall, Message to the General Assembly of
Georgia 5 (Jan. 3, 1944)).
12' The one-person, one-vote cases begin with Wesbeny v. Sanders,376 U.S. 1 (1964)
and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which establish the basic principle, and
move on to an extensive body of more refined cases elaborating precisely the extent to
which election districts can vary from the ideal. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735 (1973) (holding that minor deviations from mathematical equality in state
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Court established the principle that every person's vote must be
counted equally. Although these cases seem at first glance to involve
protective democracy claims, I hope to show in this Section that the
one-person, one-vote cases are better understood as communitarian
voting rights claims--or at least that is how the Court chose to understand them.
7 22
The leading one-person, one-vote cases are Wesbeiy v. Sanders'
and Reynolds v. Sims,2 the former establishes the one-person, one-vote
principle in federal elections, the latter in state elections. Wesbery was
an equal protection challenge brought by residents of Georgia's Fifth
Congressional District. The average population in 1960 of Georgia's
ten congressional election districts was about 400,000. The Fifth District, however, had a population of over 820,000. The smallest district, the Ninth, had a population of about 272,000, less than onethird that of the Fifth. 24 As the Court observed, "this inequality of
population means that the Fifth District's Congressman has to represent from two to three times as many people as do Congressmen from
some of the other Georgia districts."'2 5 Conversely, a vote in the Fifth
District went only a third as far toward electing a representative as a
vote in the First. This meant, according to the plaintiffs, that their
votes were not "given the same weight as the votes of other Georgians.' 26 The Court embraced this claim and invalidated the districting.
A similar arrangement was challenged in Reynolds. Under Alabama's scheme of state legislative election districts, which had not
been adjusted since 1901,
only 25.1% of the State's total population resided in districts represented by a majority of the members of the Senate, and only 25.7% lived
in counties which could elect a majority of the members of the House of
Representatives.... Bullock County, with a population of only 13,462,
and Henry County, with a population of only 15,286, each were allo-

legislative districting fail to make out a prima facie case of malapportionment); Mahan
v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (establishing a more lenient standard in state legislative
districting); Kirkpatrick v. Presler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (requiring a good faith effort to
achieve absolute equality in congressional districting). The Court extended the oneperson, one-vote principle to local governments in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474 (1968).

376 U.S. 1 (1964).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
124 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 2.
'22
'2'

12 Id.

126Id. at

3.
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cated two seats in the Alabama House, whereas Mobile County, with a
population of 314,301, was given only three seats, and.. .Jefferson
County, with over 600,000 people, was given only one senator, as was
of only 15,417, and Wilcox
Lowndes County, with a 1960 population
.7
County, with only 18,739 people.

As in Wesbeny, the plaintiffs, residents of some of the more populous districts, claimed that their right to vote was "denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote," and the
Court agreed.
What kind of democratic theory underlies these kinds of voting
rights claims? In a sense, the very notion of vote "dilution" suggests a
theory of protective democracy. As we have seen, voting under a regime of protective democracy is a means by which citizens influence
the actions of government for the purpose of protecting their rights
and liberties. Those whose votes are weighted less than fully in the
calculation of election results have a proportionately diminished ability to influence electoral outcomes. As a result, such individuals have
a correspondingly diminished ability to influence governmental policies and to protect their liberties from hostile government actions.
Some of the language in Wesbery and Reynolds clearly reflects this
view. In Wesbery, for example, the Court characterized Georgia's
malapportionment as giving "some voters a greater voice in choosing
a Congressman than others,"29 and went on to analogize malapportionment in congressional districting to the "rotten boroughs" of
Great Britain that the Framers so strongly condemned.3 In Reynolds,
the Court went even further, analogizing vote dilution to outright
disenfranchisement: "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively
as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."'' Because
the right to vote is preservative of other rights,1a2 vote dilution claims

must be scrutinized with equal care. From these propositions, the
Court concluded both that legislatures "should be bodies which are
collectively responsive to the popular will,"'33 and that equal numbers
U.S. at 545-46 (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 555.
2 Wesbeny, 376 U.S. at 14.
," Id. The phrase "rotten boroughs" refers to the most egregious instances of
'2 Reynolds, 377

malapportionment in eighteenth-century Britain. See supra text accompanying notes
74-77.
"' Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
"' See id.at
562.

Id. at 565.
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of voters should have equal control over the composition of the legis31 4
lature.
Yet even though this kind of vote dilution claim fits comfortablyperhaps most comfortably-within a theory of protective democracy,
such claims can also be understood to rest on communitarian premises.'35 Under a communitarian theory of democracy, the problem
with severe malapportionment is not that it impairs the ability of
some citizens to achieve a politically necessary degree of influence
over government officials, but simply that it allocates unequally such
influence, however slight, as citizens happen to have. The significance of malapportionment thus lies in the fact that possession of a
"full" vote is understood to be a feature of full citizenship in society.
Those who, because of improper districting, are given only a half or a
third of a vote are not, in this view, given their full due as citizensthey are relegated to a kind of second-class citizenship.
Some critical passages in the Court's decisions suggest strongly
that the Court ultimately viewed these cases in such a manner. For
example, in stunningly direct language, the Court in Reynolds
said: "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that
much less a citizen. ' ' 6 The Court then proceeded immediately to
link the debasement of voting strength to a kind of discrimination
practiced against people on the basis of where they live:

Id.
s One difficulty in conceptualizing malapportionment claims as invoking a theory of protective democracy is the minute difference in influence caused by malapportionment. After the 1980 reapportionment, for example, the average congressional
district contained over 250,000 voters. See BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT
PUZZLE 57 (1984) (explaining, after the 1980 census, that the average congressional
district in California contained over 525,000 people and over 252,000 voters). As a
result, the average vote had an infinitesimally small impact on electoral outcomessomething on the order of .000004. As Bruce Cain has observed, "anything short of a
massive population deviation would not substantially alter that value." Id. Thus, even
the kind of wide population variations at issue in Wesbeny could not have changed the
fact that all voters in Georgia, whether residing in urban or rural areas, had votes
whose protective impact was not significantly different from zero.
On the other hand, this same reasoning impugns any voting rights claim based on
a theory of protective democracy, notjust malapportionment claims, and gives rise to
the so-called paradox of voting. For an overview, see Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without
Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2136-37 (1996) (explaining the paradox that people
vote even though the chance that they could affect the outcome is small). This paradox is the basis of economic theories of rational nonvoting. The classic study on this
subject is ANTHONY DOWNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). Discussion
of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this paper.
1s6Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567.
134
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The fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate reason for over-weighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote.... A nation
once primarily rural in character becomes predominantly urban....
But the basic principle of representative government remains, and must
remain, unchanged-the weight
of a citizen's vote cannot be made to
37
depend on where he lives.

Although the Court never explicitly identified the precise nature
of the discrimination worked by Alabama's malapportionment, it
made enough oblique references to communicate plainly that the
discrimination disfavored there was by rural residents against urban
dwellers.' 3s "Legislators," the Court wrote, "represent people, not
trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or
economic interests." 9 Furthermore, "[a] citizen, a qualified voter, is
no more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm." 4 "
The Court's focus on the offense to voters' status as citizens and
its characterization of Alabama's malapportionment as a kind of discrimination by the farm against the city suggest strongly that Wesbery
and Reynolds are best understood as a kind of Gomillion for urbanites.
That is, the one-person, one-vote cases should not be understood as
the source of a body of law in which the Court acknowledges the legitimacy of voting rights claims based on theories of protective democracy. Rather, these cases reflect a judicial animosity toward the
creation of a group of second-class citizens, whether defined by race
or residence-the same kind of communitarian bias that runs
throughout the Court's voting rights jurisprudence.
In the end, what happened in the one-person, one-vote cases is
not unlike what happened in Holt. As in Holt, the Court was confronted with a voting rights claim couched predominantly in the language of protective democracy, yet chose ultimately to treat the claim
as essentially communitarian. Unlike the plaintiffs in Holt however,
the plaintiffs in the one-person, one-vote cases had not voluntarily
removed themselves from the political community at whose hands
they claimed mistreatment. Consequently, the Court had no trouble
characterizing the plaintiffs as second-class citizens within their own
political society-exactly the kind of plaintiffs who are entitled under
137 Id.

" The Court never mentioned race as a factor in either Wesberry or Reynolds, yet
race may indeed have been a factor if the Court was at least partly offended by discrimination against city dwellers on the assumption that they are disproportionately
black.
'Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
"0Id. at 568.
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communitarian-based theories of democracy to invoke the constitutional right to vote.
C. Voting Rights Claims with the Vote: The Right to Representation
The Court's preference for communitarian theories of democracy
is also reflected in some of the more complex contemporary voting
rights cases in which plaintiffs claim that the right to vote includes
what I will call a "right to representation." Unlike the earliest generadon of voting rights claims, these claims are generally made by people
who already have what might be thought of as full rights of political
participation. They may register to vote, cast ballots, and have their
ballots counted and weighed equally; they may also participate in political campaigns and even run for office. Although these claims go
by many different
names-"vote dilution,"' 4' lack of an "effective"'4 or
"meaningful" 43 vote, and the inability to "elect legislators of their
choice,"1 " for example-the underlying contention is almost always
the same: the voter claims that having the vote is not enough, and
that the right to vote includes an entitlement to some kind of reorganization of the political process that will enhance the voter's ability
to influence political outcomes. Under the existing system, such
plaintiffs say, their votes are "cancelled out,""5 "debased" 46 or ren-

dered "meaningless" ;4 7 consequently, their right to vote entitles them
to do more than simply cast ballots. Thus, the essence of the right-to,4,
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986) (reversing a district court's finding
that Indiana's state apportionment did not unconstitutionally dilute votes); Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("The complaint alleged that the
practice of electing the City Commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting
strength of Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the Fifteenth Amendment.").
"2 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c) (1) (1994) (defining "vote" and authorizing activity to make
a vote effective).
,'Mobile, 446 U.S. at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing a plurality of the
Court for holding that "in the absence of proof of intentional discrimination by the
State, the right to vote provides the politically powerless with nothing more than the
right to cast meaningless ballots").
'" White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (striking down a Texas legislative
reapportionment scheme).
145 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 129 (1971) (holding that
the record before
the Court was insufficient to show that minority votes were "cancel[led] out"); Fortson
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,439 (1965).
," Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) (striking down Missouri's congressional reapportionment scheme because it debased votes by not having interdistrict population equality).
"4 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 104 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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representation claim is that some individual or group is entitled to a
restructuring of the electoral process that will guarantee, or at least
greatly increase the likelihood, that the candidate preferred by the
individual or group will be elected.
Almost all right-to-representation claims fall into one of two categories. The first kind of claim challenges the methods of election
used within specific election districts, such as the use of multimember
districts or at-large voting. The second kind of claim, which essentially alleges gerrymandering, challenges the lines that geographically
separate one election district from another.
1. Challenges to Multimember Districts
What kinds of democratic theories underlie such claims? Let us
begin by examining the two most common challenges to multimember districts. The first challenge alleges that voters in multimember
districts have an inherent advantage over voters in single-member districts. The second challenge asserts that multimember districts
wrongfully submerge the electoral influence of political minorities
within the district.
a. The InherentAdvantage Claim

Perhaps the most straightforward and sweeping challenge to multimember districts appears in Whitcomb v. Chavis,48 one of the earliest
right-to-representation cases. In Whitcomb, a group of black voters
challenged the constitutionality of a multimember districting scheme
in Marion County, Indiana, which allocated fifteen state representatives and eight state senators to the county.4 9 One basis for the plaintiffs' challenge was their contention that multimember districts are
inherently unconstitutional because they provide disproportionate
political influence to residents of the multimember district as compared with residents of single-member districts."' ° The plaintiffs relied on a mathematical theory of voter influence according to which
"the true test of voting power is the ability to cast a tie-breaking, or
'critical' vote."' 51 Using this definition, the plaintiffs were able to
demonstrate mathematically that the use of multimember districts

4

403 U.S. 124 (1971).

See id.at 128 n.2.
144.
'S'
Id.at 145 n.23 (explaining plaintiffs' mathematics).
'

'50 See id. at
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"gives undue voting power to the voter in the multi-member district
since he has more chances to determine election outcomes than the
The plaintiffs also relied on
voter in the single-member district.
another theory identifying a tendency among representatives of multimember districts to vote as a bloc.'5 They claimed that voters in
multimember districts have "more effective representation ....
[S] ince multi-member delegations are elected at large and represent
the voters of the entire district, they tend to vote as a bloc, which is
tantamount to the district having one representative with several
votes."' 5
It is clear that the plaintiffs in Whitcomb were speaking the language of protective democracy. What concerned them was not any
kind of exclusion, but the relative abilities of citizens to influence
election results and, consequently, to influence their representatives.
The Court recognized the nature of the underlying claim, characterizing it as a claim concerning "the quality of representation afforded
by the5 5multi-member district as compared with single-member districts."

As it has done with all the other protective democracy-based arguments examined thus far, the Court rejected the claim.' - ' The
Court dismissed the plaintiffs' mathematical argument as
"theoretical,"i5 7 and criticized it for failing to take into account "any
political or other factors which might affect the actual voting power of
'52 Id. at

144-45.
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See id.at 146-47.

'

Id. at 146.

i Id. at 142.

In Whitcomb, the Court used strangely hedging language that gave the impression of not entirely closing the door to protective democracy-based challenges to multimember districts. The Court did not say, for example, that multi-member districting
could not work a constitutionally cognizable form of discrimination, but only that nobody had "so far" demonstrated such discrimination. Id. at 143. The Court did not
reject the plaintiffs' claims outright, but was "not ready" to endorse them. Id. at 147. It
was not that the challenged practices were consistent with equal protection, but that
the Court did "not yet deem[] it a denial of equal protection." Id. at 153. The Court
did not say that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim, but only that "experience and
insight have not yet demonstrated that multi-member districts are inherently invidious." Id. at 159-60. Thus, the Court did not reject the claim absolutely, but only "[a]s
presently advised." Id. at 160.
This language has tantalized voting rights advocates for years. But if the Court was
ever on the cusp of recognizing such claims, it soon changed course dramatically. See,
e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (requiring a showing of intentional discrimination).
157 See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 147.
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the residents."'" Likewise, the bloc voting argument "remains to be
demonstrated in practice" and was deemed by the Court to be too theoretical and not adequately supported in the record' 59
b. Submersion Claims

A more common challenge to multimember districts or other systems using at-large voting is a submersion claim-the contention that
multimember districts "submerge minorities""'O by causing them to be
underrepresented relative to their numbers within the district. The
plaintiffs in Whitcomb, for example, also made a submersion claim: they
argued that poor blacks in certain neighborhoods were unable to elect
representatives of their choice to the state legislature under the multimember district system, but would be able to elect three representatives and one senator if the county were subdivided into single-member
districts.1 'r
7 12 black and Mexican-American plainSimilarly, in White v. Regester,
tiffs challenged the use of multimember districts in Dallas and San Antonio, Texas. Following the 1970 census, the Texas legislature enacted
a reapportionment plan which divided the state's 150 House members
into ninety election districts. Seventy-nine of the districts were singlemember districts in which residents of the district elected a single representative. Eleven of these districts, including the two challenged in
the case, were multimember districts, meaning that residents of the district elected several representatives.

Elections from the multimember

districts were governed by a "place" rule. Under this rule, candidates
were required to run for a particular place on the ticket and could not
compete against candidates running for different places within the
multimember district; as the Court observed, this turned the election of
candidates from multimember districts into "a head-to-head contest for
each position. '"'" In their voting rights claim, the plaintiffs contended
that they had been discriminatorily deprived of their right "to partici-

'

Id. at 146 (citing Transcript at 39).
Id. at 147.
0 Id. at 159.

"" See id. at 129.
16

412 U.S. 755 (1973).

" See id- at 761.

' Id. at 766. The Court also found that the discriminatory effects of the "place"
rule were exacerbated by the requirement of a "majority vote as a prerequisite to
nomination" in party nominating primaries. Id.
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pate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. " " 5
Simply as a matter of logic, the claims in these and similar cases appear to be based on a theory of protective democracy. Under communitarian theories of democracy, voting rights claims are claims to full
membership in society. Because full membership in American society
is defined in part by possession of the right to cast a ballot, those who
lack such a right experience their disenfranchisement as a form of exclusion tantamount to a kind of second-class citizenship. Thus, communitarian theories in many cases seem to underlie challenges to disenfranchisement. Where individuals already have the franchise,
however, communitarian claims seem somewhat less apt. If full membership in society is measured by having the right to cast a ballot, then
those who have the vote have all to which communitarian theories entitle them.""
Consequently, the voting rights claims made in cases like Whitcomb
and Regester are probably better thought of as protective in nature. The
claimants in these cases complain about multimember districting not so
much because it excludes them from full social membership as because
the practice impairs their ability to use the vote to protect their rights
and liberties.'( 7 If we can never vote for a winner, the claimants seem to
say, how can we ever use the ballot to protect ourselves from governmental overreaching? The plaintiffs' language in these cases bears out
this reasoning. In Whitcomb, for example, the plaintiffs claimed that the
districting scheme "diluted the force and effect" of the votes of poor
blacks within the district."'

Under the Indiana scheme, they argued,

the plaintiffs "have almost no political force or control over legislators. " Indeed, the Court directl, characterized the plaintiffs'
claim as
one complaining of "inadequate protection to minorities." 70

165Id.

" The implications of relaxing this assumption are explored further infra Part
IV.A.
107For similar interpretations of vote dilution claims, see Joan F. Hartman, Racial

Vote Dilution and Separationof Powers: An Exploration of the Conflict Between theJudicial
"Intent" and the Legislative "Results" Standards,50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689, 691, 709
(1982); Karlan, Maps and Misreadings, supra note 29, at 176 (giving an account of
.qualitative" vote dilution).
'
Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 128.
Id. at 129.
70Idat 159.
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c. The Court's Turn to Intentionality
If submersion claims seem, both in logic and in rhetoric, to be
based on a theory of protective democracy, then we would expect to see
the Court reject such claims. This was indeed the outcome in Whitcomb,
yet not in Regester. Why? The answer lies in a pattern that is becoming
increasingly familiar: although the plaintiffs couched their claim in the
language and logic of protective democracy, the Court answered in
communitarian terms. It did so by turning strikingly to intentional discrimination as the benchmark against which such claims are evaluated.
In Whitcomb, for example, the Court had barely identified the submersion claim before it noted that "there is no suggestion here that
Marion County's multi-member district, or similar districts throughout
the State, were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further
racial or economic discrimination."'. Similarly, in Regester-the only
case in which the Court has invalidated a multimember district on a
submersion claim-the Court focused heavily on the local history of intentional racial and ethnic discrimination "in the fields of education,
employment, economics, health, [and] politics."'2 Apparently, this record allowed the Court to infer, in the absence of direct evidence, that
the multimember districts at issue were maintained deliberately, for the
discriminatory purpose of minimizing black and Mexican-American political influence.' 3 This series of cases culminated in Mobile v. Bolden,'74
in which the Court held that intentional discrimination was a necessary
element of a vote dilution claim under either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. The decisive difference between Whitcomb and Regester was the plaintiffs' presentation of adequate evidence of intentional discrimination in the latter, and not in the former.
In turning to intentionality as the touchstone of a vote submersion
claim, the Court treated these claims in a way that comports far better
with communitarian than protective theories of democracy. Theories
of protective democracy are, for the most part, unconcerned with questions of intent. Under a regime of protective democracy what counts is
citizens' influence over the machinery of government, not the intenId. at 149.
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768 (1973).
17sThis, at least, is how the Court has retrospectively characterized Rtgester. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 68-70 (1980). Although the accuracy of this characterization
is open to question, see, eg., Hartman, supranote 167, at 706, it makes little difference
given the Court's holding in Bolden which explicitly required a showing of discriminatory
purpose.
174 446 U.S. at 66-70.
'
17
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tions of governmental actors toward particular individuals or groups.
The essence of an offense against protective democracy is the diminution ofinfluence, whether intentional or not. 5
This is not to say that intention plays no role whatsoever in theories
of protective democracy. 76 Even under protective democracy, the intentional deprivation of electoral influence may be worse than unintentional deprivations. For example, individuals or groups may be most in
need of electoral influence precisely when the government intentionally discriminates against them in distributing the franchise. Such discrimination reveals an underlying hostility toward the disenfranchised
group that could subsequently manifest itself in attacks on the group's
rights and liberties, the preservation of which is the ultimate aim of
protective democracy. In general, however, intentionality is not usually
thought to be the hallmark of a protective democracy voting rights
claim.'77 Protective democracy works best, not as ajustification for spot
responses to specific problems of intentional governmental misbehavior, but as a permanent, broad framework for assuring political influence so as to prevent intentional governmental misbehavior from occurring in the first place.
In contrast, an intentionality requirement comports much better
with a theory of communitarian democracy. The essence of an offense
against communitarian democracy is exclusion-in this case, exclusion
from the vote on the basis of race. Although it is certainly possible for
175Justice Marshall took this position in his dissent in Bolden.

See id. at 108-12
(Marshall,J, dissenting).
176 In a sense, protective democracy, particularly in its American version, is based on a
presumption of intentional government misbehavior. In Madison's view, the abuse of

government power by officials was inevitable. See THE FEDERAISr No. 51 (James Madison).
1 For example,John Hart Ely's theory of representation reinforcement,
which relies
heavily on notions of protective democracy, casts the federal courts in the role of assuring
groups of adequate input into the political process. SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST:

A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW

117 (1980) (stating that clearing access to the

"democratic process iswhatjudicial review ought preeminently to be about"). But there
is nothing about this function that would limit courts' ability to look for barriers to participation that are erected deliberately. Ely is quite clear on this point. Where the right
to vote is concerned,
[t]he Court's job ... is to look at the world as it exists and ask whether such a
right is in fact being abridged, and if it is,to consider what reasons might be
adduced in support of the deprivation, without regard to what actually occasioned it. To the extent that there is a stoppage, the system is malfunctioning, and the Court should unblock it without caring how it got that way.
Id. at 136 (footnote omitted). For a half-hearted attempt to suggest a reason why intent
would be important to the resolution of protective democracy-based voting rights claims,
see Larry Alexander, Lost in thePoliticalThicket, 41 FLA. L REV. 563,565-67 (1989).
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individuals or groups to be excluded from the vote unintentionallyfor example, as an unforeseen consequence of some facially neutral set
of electoral procedures-any such exclusion is unquestionably worse
when it is deliberate. Communitarian democracy is concerned not with
citizens' privileges,<but with their sense of belonging; what matters is
that individuals and groups be treated, and understand themselves to
be treated, in every respect as full members of society. While it might
be possible for generous and good-natured citizens to continue to feel
like full members of society even after suffering some kind of exclusion
as an unintended consequence of a nominally benign policy, they cannot possibly feel like full members of society when their fellow citizens
band together and exclude them intentionally, in an act of deliberate
discrimination.'78 For these reasons, the Court's conclusion that minority submersion claims are cognizable only in the presence of intentional
racial discrimination'J suggests strongly that the Court understood the
claims in these cases to embody a communitarian view of the significance of voting.
Ironically, however, not even the Court's turn to intentionality
could insulate it from the underlying protective democracy aspects of
the plaintiffs' claims in these cases. Our legal system does not generally
recognize the possession ofbad intentions as a cognizable legal offense;
some kind of harm is also required.' 0 Unless the Court was willing to
recognize the manifestation of a racially based intent to exclude as sufficient harm in itself to violate the Constitution-a position it has always
resisted'-some harm would have to be found. The plaintiffs, of
,78One might even argue that "exclusion," in the communitarian sense, can only occur intentionally. The goal of communitarian democracy is recognition as a citizen, but
recognition depends necessarily on the state of mind of others. To be something less
than a full citizen is by definition to be an object of scorn, or at least of indifference.
Thus, if something is important enough to serve as an indicium of full citizenship (such
as voting) then its deprivation can only be "intentional" in a communitarian sense. In
other words, it is impossible to deny any person standing as a full citizen in any way other
than deliberately. On this view, the Court's Fifteenth Amendmentjurisprudence is confusing because it focuses on intent rather than exclusion, yet in the end they amount to
the same thing.
'

See supranote 174 and accompanying text.

Seegenerally MODEL PENAL CODE, Art. 2 (1985).
See, eg., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) ("[N]o case in this Court
has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations ofthe men who voted for it"); see alsoWashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)
(requiring "invidious quality" as well as a "racially discriminatory purpose"); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973) (requiring school segregation as well as intentional state action to support the finding of a dual system requiring an affirmative duty
to desegregate the school system). It is possible however, to characterize Gomillion v.
"'
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course, argued all along that the harm they had suffered was the degradation of their ability to use the political system to protect themselvesa protective democracy harm.
Surprisingly, the Court never for a moment questioned this definition of the relevant harm. In Regester,for example, the Court remedied
the discriminatory exclusion of the plaintiffs not by attempting to craft
some solution that would integrate blacks and Mexican-Americans into
the political life of Dallas and Bexar Counties,ee but by ordering the
breakup of the multimember districts into single-member districtsssthat is, by giving these groups the political influence they sought. In
this way, the Court inadvertently smuggled a significant protective democracy component into a case it was trying to treat as communitarian.
This tension in the right-to-representation cases lay dormant for
some time, probably because it was obscured by the overwhelmingly racial nature of the cases. It came clearly into view, however, in the area
of political gerrymandering, which lacked the usual overtones of racial
bigotry.
2. Political Gerrymandering
Political gerrymandering is surely among the most difficult problems in voting rightsjurisprudence 184 The Court's only decision in this
area is Davis v. Bandemer,'ss in which members of the Indiana Democratic Party challenged Indiana's 1980 redistricting plan, enacted by a
Republican-controlled legislature and signed by a Republican gover-

Lightfoot; 364 U.S. 339 (1960), as such a case. See supraPart IIA2.
182 Cf Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
i's See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (affirming the district court's
judgment "insofar as it invalidated the multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties and ordered those districts to be redrawn into single-member districts").
'84Political gerrymandering has been termed the "thickest thicket" by Peter Schuck.
See Schuck, supra note 14, at 1325. There are several reasons for focusing on political
rather than racial gerrymandering. First, the law of racial gerrymandering has been
dominated since 1965 by the Voting Rights Act, which complicates the analysis. Second,
the few pre-Voting Rights Act cases make clear that intentional racial gerrymandering will
be treated as a communitarian offense. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),
and discussion supra Part IIA2. Third, claims of unintentional racial and political gerrymandering raise problems that are not significantly distinct. See Daniel H. Lowenstein
&Jonathan Steinberg, The QuestforLegislativeDistrictingin the PublicInterest: Elusive or llu-

sory, 33 UCIA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1985) (noting that "the definition and recognition of racial
gerrymandering is beset by some of the methodological problems we identify in connection with political gerrymandering").
'n 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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nor.ss The challenge focused on the way in which the legislature had
drawn district lines and mixed single-member and multimember dis7
tricts.1 As a result of this plan, the plaintiffs charged, Democratic candidates for the state House of Representatives won only 43% of the seats
despite winning 52% of the statewide vote. ss' In Marion and Allen
Counties, which include Indianapolis, Democratic candidates attracted
47% of the vote, but won only 3 of 21 House seats.' 9 Additional evidence showed that Republicans openly admitted that their principal
purpose in the reapportionment process had been to maximize Republican victories in a state in which voters were nearly evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats.' 90 The plaintiffi challenged the Republicans' intentional minimization ofDemocratic voting strength.
The Court's approach' 9 ' to these claims largely followed its approach in the earlier right-to-representation cases involving multimember districts.'9 The plaintiffs, apparently assuming that the Court
would apply an intentionality standard, took pains to provide ample
evidence of deliberate discrimination against them.9 3 The Court not
only accepted the lower court's factual finding of intentional discrimination against Democrats, 94 but also came close to holding that intentional discrimination against political opponents can be virtually assumed in the political power struggles of reapportionment.1
'

Seeid.at 113-15.

See id. at 115 ("Specifically, they contended that the particular district lines that
were drawn and the mix of single-member and multimember districts were intended to
and did violate their right, as Democrats, to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
1' See id.
" See id.
"'
See i&at 114 n.1, 116-17 (concluding that the facts "evidenced an intentional effort to favor Republican incumbents and candidates and to disadvantage Democratic
voters").
"' Although a majority found political gerrymanderingjusticiable, only a plurality of
four Justices adhered to the principal analysis. I shall nevertheless treat this as the
Court's analysis because its reasoning seems never to have been questioned by subsequent Court majorities, and because it is possible to read the other opinions as giving the
plurality a fifth vote on the critical issues. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer
Gap: GrnandeingandEqualProtection,inPOLTICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS
64, 91, 95 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) (arguing that the plurality's reasoning was accepted by a majority of the Court).
2 The Court went out of its way to note its reliance on the multimember, racial discrimination cases, and to stress the similarity of the relevant legal standards. See Bandmer,
478 U.S. at 131 n.12 & 132 n.13.
'gs Seeid.at 115.
'9 Seeid.at 127.
"

See i&.at 128-29 ("As long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be
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At this point, however, the question of harm came forcefully into
view. Although the plaintiffs had framed their case to meet an intentionality standard, there was no escaping the fact that, as in the multimember district cases, the harm they claimed was to their protective
democracy interests. Indeed, their claim appealed to theories of protective democracy on two levels: the plaintiffs claimed not only that the
Republicans had made it difficult for Democrats to use the political system to protect their interests, but also that the districting legislation
perpetuated that very danger by assuring future Republican control of
the apparatus ofgovernment.' 6
Here the Court found itself trapped between its dislike for protective democracy-based claims on the one hand and the reliance on protective harms implicit in its communitarian approach on the other.
The Court responded with a compromise that could have pleased no
one: it held that the protective harms pled by the plaintiffs were constitutionally cognizable, but that the plaintiffs had not shown that they

had actually been harmed in the way they claimed.1 97 The Court
reached this conclusion by holding that an allegation of harm to a political party through a discriminatory reapportionment could not be
proved by examining the results of a single election following the real>portionment;9 8 such harm could be shown only by demonstrating a
consistent pattern of electoral defeat. Of course, this definition may
well foreclose political gerrymandering claims: by the .time a minority
party has waited out two or three elections following the implementation of a reapportionment plan and then spent several years in complex
litigation challenging the plan, the next decennial reapportionment
will likely have arrived. Thus, the Court's recognition of protective democracy harms may be mostly theoretical."'

very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were
intended.").
'9
See id. at 116-17; see also Schuck, supranote 14, at 1327-28, 1337-38 (discussing diminished legitimacy and self-perpetuation in power as reasons for considering political
gerrymandering improper).
See Bandemer,478 U.S. at 143 (stating that "a threshold showing of discriminatory
vote dilution is required for a prima facie case of an equal protection violation" and that
such a threshold had not been reached).
'9 See id. at 135.
'99See Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828, 833 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (3judge court)
(noting that the BandemerCourt"offered little hope that political plaintiffs might prevail"
on claims of political gerrymandering). Research uncovered only one case since Bandmer in which plaintiffs prevailed on a political gerrymandering claim, but that judgment
was recently vacated for reconsideration in light of new evidence from the 1994 elections.
See Republican Party v. Hunt, No. 88-263-CIV-5-F, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19962 (E.D.N.C.

A RECONSIDERATION OFTHE RIGHT TO VOTE

1997]

D. The Court'sNewfound Hostility TowardSection 2 ofthe VotingRights Act
In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has expressed increasing hostility toward section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,200 and has
hinted none too subtly that it might eventually strike down section 2 on
constitutional grounds.2 0 ' The Court's hostility toward protective democracy-based voting rights claims, as demonstrated above, helps to
explain this development. In this Section, I argue that the Court dislikes section 2 because the 1982 amendments to that provision implemented a protective-democracy solution to a problem that the Court
defines as communitarian.
1. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 under its power,
conferred by section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,202 to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment's command that the right to vote "shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race [or] color. 2 0 3 As originally enacted, section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act closely tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment:
"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
any citizen of the United
subdivision to deny or abridge the right of
24
0
color."
or
race
of
account
on
vote
to
States
When the Court first encountered the Voting Rights Act in South
Carolinav. Katzenbach,20"a broad-based challenge to the entire statutory
scheme, the Court enthusiastically upheld the Act in its entirety.
"Congress," the Court said, "felt itself confronted by an insidious and
pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution."2 0
The Court then reviewed some of the most egregious examples of

Nov. 3, 1994), remanded,No. 94-2410, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (4th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996).
200 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).

201 SeeMiller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).

But see Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (fourJustices willing to implicitly assume the

constitutionality of section 2).
2' U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
20 id. § i.

20 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
203 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
206Id. at

309.
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overt, racially discriminatory state and local efforts to avoid registering
black votersY. These examples, the Court held, amply justified Congress's exercise of its power under the Fifteenth Amendment, and the
Act itself was "a valid2 0means
for carrying out the commands of the Fif8
teenth Amendment.

Here we are confronted with an ambiguity- what exactly were the
"commands of the Fifteenth Amendment" that the Voting Rights Act
carried out? The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits racial discrimination
in voting-but why? Is the purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment to assure blacks the ability to influence government for the purpose of protecting their rights and liberties? Does it, in other words, serve a theory
of protective democracy? Or does the Fifteenth Amendment prohibit
discrimination in voting for communitarian reasons-to end a stinging
affront to blacks caused by their exclusion from the electoral process,
and to embrace them officially as full members of American society?
Might both rationales underlie the Fifteenth Amendment?
The Court found it unnecessary to address these questions in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, and indeed the question never had to be addressed by anyone so long as Voting Rights Act enforcement focused, as
it did for many years, on eliminating the most obvious, intentional, and
discriminatory efforts to disenfranchise blacks. 20

Because such dis-

crimination both excludes blacks from the political process and undermines their ability to protect their liberties through the electoral
process, no need to distinguish between these two impacts arose.
2. The Communitarian Fifteenth Amendment
In 1980, the Court finally confronted this latent ambiguity. City of
Mobile v. BoldenW2 ' involved a challenge to the at-large system of municipal elections used by Mobile, Alabama. Under Mobile's system, the city
was governed by a City Commission consisting of three members, each
of whom was elected at large.2 The plaintiffs, black voters who lived in

207 See
20Id.

id. at 310-13.
at 337.

See Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 145, 150 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) ("The initial focus of
efforts under the act was on registration and voting, through suspension of literacy
tests."); GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 29, at 212 n.58 ("The initial structure of the Act
itself focused on the suspension of literacy tests, the deployment offederal registrars, and
federal administrative review of local registration procedures in coveredjurisdictions.").
210 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
211 See id. at59-60.
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Mobile, charged that this at-large voting scheme violated their rights
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, because the scheme prevented the plaintiffs
for all practical purposes from electing candidates of their choice to the
Commission. The Court, however, rejected all three challenges, with a
four-Justice plurality providing the dominant reasoning.212
Crucial to the plurality's analysis was the factual finding of the district court that "Negroes in Mobile 'register and vote without hindrance.',2

3
'

From this and other evidence, the plurality concluded that

the plaintiffs had not shown a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment
because they had failed to produce any evidence that either the repeated losses of black-supported candidates or the city's continued
maintenance of the at-large election system resulted from intentional
racial discrimination. As we have seen, this kind of reliance on intentional discrimination is far more consistent with communitarian than
with protective notions of democracy, and the Court's decision thus
strongly aligns the Fifteenth Amendment with a communitarian definition of the harm suffered by blacks whose right to vote is infringed.
After interpreting the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court in Bolden
went on to consider the plaintiffs' claim under section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. Because Congress had enacted the Voting Rights Act to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, and because the language of section 2
essentially tracks the language of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court
concluded that section 2 should be read identically. 2 5 Consequently,
the Court interpreted section 2 to reach only intentional discrimination
in the distribution of the franchise.2" Read together, the Court's decisions in City ofMobile v. Bolden and South Carolinav. Katzenbachthus describe a section 2 that provided a communitarian remedy to a commu212 A

majority of the Court later ratified the plurality's analytical approach in Rogersv.

Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982), but the Court there sustained the challenge to the atlarge voting scheme because the lower courts properly found the scheme was maintained
for a discriminatory purpose. Seeia.
211Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65 (quoting the district court without citation).
214 See id. In so holding, the Court brought its Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence
into agreement with its equal protection jurisprudence as articulated in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (rejecting a disparate impact theory of equal protection
and holding that a showing of intentional discrimination is necessary to make out a violation of the implicit equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause).
2'S See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 61 (noting that section 2was "intended
to have an effect no
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment"; it "simply restated the prohibitions
already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment").
21, See id.at 61-65 (discussing the Court's Fifteenth Amendmentjurisprudence).
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nitarian problem, thereby assuring the provision's constitutionality.
3. The 1982 Amendments and the Protective Solution
Congress significantly disturbed this symmetry in 1982, when it
amended section 2 for the express purpose of overturning the result in
Bolden. 7 The amendment changed section 2 to provide:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a mannerwhich results in a denial or abridgement of the right of

any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color
218

Congress went on to define a violation of this revised standard to
include a showing that members of a group protected by the Act "have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."219 In
construing this language in Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court
held that, under the revised section 2, "a violation could be proved by
showing discriminatory effect alone," and that Congress intended section 2 to establish a "results test. " 22°
The significance of these changes can hardly be overstated. The
focus of a section 2 inquiry suddenly shifted dramatically from the subjective intentions of the government to the impact of voting.procedures
on the political influence of the group claiming discrimination. According to the Court, resolution of section 2 claims would now require
examination of factors such as the extent of racially polarized voting in
the district; exclusion of members of the minority group from the
process of candidate slating; the extent to which past discrimination
against members of the minority group in education, employment and
health care has "hinder[ed] their ability to participate effectively in the
political process";2' "the extent to which members of the minority
group have been elected to public office in thejurisdiction"; and the

217

Seemhornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-44 (1986) (discussing the legislative his-

tory of the 1982 amendments).
21 Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96
Stat. 131, 134
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994)) (emphasis added).
219 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
2" Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35. The results test in question was one that, according to
Congress, the Court had articulated in White v. Regester,412 U.S. 755 (1973). See id&
2' Ginges,478 U.S. at 37.
22

Id.
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responsiveness of elected officials to the needs of the minority group.'
The Court also held that in order to prevail on a vote-dilution claim involving multimember districts, members of the complaining minority
would have to prove "substantial difficulty electing representatives of
their choice."24
This analysis suggests strongly that Congress did more in the
amended section 2 than merely change the standard for a violation: it
changed to a considerable degree the conception of democracy on
which the statute was based, from communitarian to protective. Under
the new section 2, the measure of a violation is no longer simply exclusion from the political process; now, the measure of a violation is exclusion from the political process that impairs the political fortunes of the
excluded group. The inability to nominate candidates, elect officials,
or to secure a responsive hearing from those elected are all factors that
reflect a group's lack of political influence, and hence its vulnerability-they are the kind offactors, in other words, that one would expect
to be relevant under a theory of protective democracy.
This need not mean, of course, that communitarian factors play no
role under section 2. First, as we shall see at further length in Part IV,
there is no unbreachable dividing line between communitarian and
protective theories of democracy. A group's inability to influence the
political process may also reflect the kind of exclusion from social grace
that offends communitarian conceptions of democracy. Second, some
of the other factors identified by the Court as relevant to establishing a
section 2 violation-a history of racial discrimination in the district, racially polarized voting, and the use of racial appeals in political campaigns,2 to name a few-sound more in communitarian than in protective theories of democracy. Third, the Court took pains to point out
that a section 2 violation is not established by any particular formula,
but by a totality of the relevant circumstances.2"
For these reasons, it is plausible to view the amended section 2 as
guided, at least in part, by a mix of communitarian and protective conceptions. Which conception is dominant, then, may depend heavily on
which factors are emphasized in the section 2 analysis. The more the
analysis emphasizes discrimination and exclusion, the more communitarian it is; the more the analysis emphasizes electoral influence and

225

See id.

2" 1&at 51 n.15.
2 See i. at 44-45.
22" See id.at 45-46.
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success, the more protective. As courts and commentators have widely
noted, Voting Rights Act enforcement since 1982 has been dominated
increasingly by an emphasis on the electoral success of minority
groups.s Indeed, in Gingles,Justice O'Connor went so far as to accuse
the majority of creating "an entitlement to roughly proportional representation. "228 This is exactly the development that has most troubled
the Court: the ascendance of a protective-democracy reading of section
2 and the concomitant application of protective-democracy solutions to
problems that the Court defines as communitarian.
4. The Court's Hostile Reaction
In its first confrontation with the amended version of section 2, in
Thornburgv. Gingles, the Court gave no sign of any dissatisfaction with
the provision; it confined itself to interpreting section 2.2 It was not
until 1993, in Shaw v. Reno,2ms that the Court's attitude toward the Voting Rights Act began to shift dramatically. Shaw concerned the legality
of North Carolina's 1990 redistricting plan in which, under pressure
exerted by the Justice Department under section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, the State created a majority-black district of a highly unusual, elongated shape. The plaintiffs claimed that the district's "bizarre" ss shape
2 See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 900 n.7 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Ift
should be clear that the assumptions that have guided the Court reflect only one possible
understanding of effective exercise of the franchise, an understanding based on the view
thatvoters are 'represented' only when they choose a delegate who will mirror theirviews
in the legislative halls."); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 93 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) ("[E]lectoral
success has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution
claims."); City of Carrolton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1562 (11th
Cir. 1987) (referring to minority electoral success as "most important to a vote [dilution]
claim"), cert. denied,485 U.S. 936 (1988); Collins v. City of Norfolk, 816 F.2d 932, 937 (4th
Cir. 1987) (remanding to determine "minority electoral success" and defining that term);
Jackson v. Edgefield County, S.C. Sch. Dist., 650 F. Supp. 1176, 1200 (D.S.C. 1986)
(referring to minority electoral success as one of the two most important factors in a section 2 case); ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? passim (1987); Abrams,
supra note 45, at 507 (stating that within the "totality of circumstances" test, "past electoral performance of the plaintiff group has gained importance"); Samuel Issacharoff,
PolarizedVoting and the PoliticalProcess: The Transformationof Voting RightsJurisprudence,90
MIC-t. L REV. 1833, 1852 (1992) (stating that the Gingesstandard requires that plaintiffs
show that a "pattern of bloc voting by the majority community has, over time, generally
led to the defeat of minority-supported candidates").
'2 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 93 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1026 (1994) (O'Connor, J, concurring) (commending the Court for holding
that evidence of minority electoral success is always relevant, but never dispositive).
M 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
20 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
'31 Id. at 644.
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showed that the State had drawn the district lines for racial reasons, and
that this race-consciousness in apportionment violated their Fourteenth
2
Amendment right "to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process.",
Surprisingly, the Court proved highly receptive to this claim.m Calling
North Carolina's race-conscious districting a form of "political apartheid,"2m the Court remanded the case for full adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims.2
The Court explained and refined the holding of Shaw two years
later in Miller v. Johnson,2 a factually similar case from Georgia. It held
that the claim recognized in Shaw was a claim that "the State has used
race as a basis for separating voters into districts." 23 7 Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court said that a plaintiff can prevail on such a claim by
showing "that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without
a particular district. " 2 The districting at issue in Millerfailed this analysis because the State created the district not to remedy past discrimination, but "to satisfy the Justice Department's preclearance demands" for
a third majority-black district in Georgia. 2s These demands, made by
the Justice Department pursuant to its authority under the Voting
Rights Act, did not provide the State with a compelling justification for
its districting plan: "compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws
cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged district was
not reasonably necessary
under a constitutional reading and applica240
tion of those laws."

These rulings suggest that one of tw6 things is wrong with Voting
Rights Act enforcement as currently practiced by the Justice Depart-

2

Id.at 641-42.

m Commentary on the Court's opinion has been extensive. See, e.g., Bierstein, supra
note 37, at 1459; Emily Calhoun, Shaw v. Reno: On the Bordedine, 65 U. COLO. L.REV.
137, 148-49 (1993); Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in
RacialGenymanderingClaims,1 MICH.J. RACE & L. 47 (1996); Pamela S. Karlan, All Overthe
Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Tilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 246; Lisa A. Kelly,
Race and Place: Geographicand Transcendent Community in the Post-Shaw Era, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 227, 235 (1996); Symposium, The Futureof Voting RightsAfterShaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 483 (1993); Symposium, Voting Rights After Shaw v. Reno, 26 RUTGERS LJ.517
(1995); VotingRights Symposium 3 D.C. L. REV. 1 (1995).
234 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
2
See id. at 658.
2% 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).

Id. at 2485-86.
m Id. at 2488.
2"Id. at 2489.
2'0 Id.at 2490.
237
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ment: either the Justice Department has misconstrued section 2 to

authorize the race-conscious creation of majority-minority districts for
the purpose of increasing minority representation; or the Department
has correctly construed the statute and it is unconstitutional. In either
case, the Court's ultimate goal seems to be to prune section 2 back to its
1965 limits. This is a striking development, for it not only threatens the
Court's important holding in Katzenbach v. Morga 24' that Congress has
the power to define civil rights violations more expansively than does
the Constitution itself, but also represents a determination that the
Fourteenth Amendment acts as a limit on the Fifteenth Amendment.
Aside from the counterintuitive proposition that earlier amendments
can limit later ones, such a reading seems to make the Fifteenth
Amendment almost completely redundant since the Court has construed the Fourteenth Amendment to limit intentional racial discrimination in any matters, including, it would seem, voting.242
The question of section 2's constitutionality, considered only
obliquely and by implication in Shaw and Miller, came forcefully into
the open last term in Bush v. Vera, 4 a highly splintered decision invalidating three congressional districts in Texas. Despite Justice
O'Connor's passionate defense of the lukewarm position that section 2
should for now be presumed constitutional, 2 4 five Justices seem to
agree that the course undertaken in Shaw leads inevitably to section 2's
invalidation. 24' Although the Court's movement toward invalidating the
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act comports at best uncomfortably with some of its earlier rulings under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, its position in the Shaw line of cases comports
quite well with the Court's longstanding hostility to protective democ-

241

384 U.S. 641 (1966).

2142See

Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscoveringthe lifteenth

Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REv. 389 (1985) (arguing that the Court has improperly ignored
the Fifteenth Amendment); Grier Stephenson,Jr., The Supreme Court, the Franchise,andthe
lifteenth Amendment: TheFirstSixty Years, 57 UMKC L REV. 47 (1988) (same).
24 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (plurality opinion).
244 Id. at 1969-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The plurality ofJustice O'Connor,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy also was implicitly willing to assume the
Act's constitutionality. Id. at 1961 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
24 Justices Thomas and Scalia took the position that the intentional creation of any
majority-minority district requires strict scrutiny. Id. at 1972 (Thomas,J., concurring). In
light of their positions in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), it is
difficult to view their position in Bush as anything other than a prelude to declaring section 2 unconstitutional. In their dissent in Bush, Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
argued that pursuit of Shards logic leads ultimately to declaring the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional. SeeBush, 116 S. Ct. at 2010, 2011 (SouterJ., dissenting).

19971

A RECONSIDERATION OFTHE RIGHT TO VOTE

racy-based voting rights claims. In setting itself against the use of section 2 as a vehicle for the expansion of the political influence of racial
minorities, the Court may be merely extending a line it has already
staked out between permissible communitarian-based and impermissible protective-based justifications for enforcing the right to vote.
III. REASONS FOR THE COURT'S PREFERENCES

The previous Part demonstrated that, in many cases, in many different contexts, the Court has expressed a general hostility toward voting rights claims based on theories of protective democracy and a correspondingly greater receptiveness to voting rights claims based on
theories of communitarian democracy. These preferences may be
rough-they may not come through clearly or uniformly in every
case-but the pattern is there. The next question is: Why? What accounts for these preferences?
In this Part, I argue that the inherent logic of a protective democracy-based voting rights claim forces the Court to do something that it
has never wanted to do: commit itself to the principle that the Constitution creates a definite, judicially discernible structure for the exercise
of popular political power. The reasons the Court has historically given
for wanting to avoid this task go to its view of its own competence. Another reason, however, may well be that the Court wishes to avoid publicly pronouncing the unappealing conclusion that the Constitution
provides Americans with a level of political influence that is not merely
minimal, but unacceptable by contemporary standards of democratic
self-government.
In comparison, communitarian theories of democracy look far
more attractive, and the assertion of such theories has allowed the
Court to make an end run around the features of protective democracy
that it finds unattractive. Rather than relying on constitutionally established baselines of political influence, the Court has used communitarian-based claims as a vehicle for turning to American community understandings and democratic traditions-understandings and traditions
that are far more democratic than the actual constitutional structure of
politics.
Finally, this Part concludes by examining the ways in which the
Court's designation of the Equal Protection Clause as the primary repository of constitutionally protected voting rights has facilitated the
Court's substitution of communitarian for protective concepts of democracy.
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A. The Logic ofProtectiveDemocracy-BasedVoting Rights Claims
1. The Conceptual Structure of the Claim
The essence of a protective democracy-based voting rights claim is a
claim of inadequate political influence. The claimant says, in effect,
"My ability to influence the political process is inadequate; as a consequence, I am unable adequately to protect my rights and liberties."
This formulation immediately raises a critical question: how much influence over the political process is "adequate"? The purpose of protective democracy is, after all, to allow citizens to protect themselves. This
kind of protection requires political power. To respond to a protective
democracy-based voting rights claim, then, we must know the degree of
political power to which citizens are entitled under a protective democracy regime.
A useful starting point for answering this question is provided by
political scientist Robert Dahl. According to Dahl, one of the criteria
that citizens of liberal democracies use to evaluate the acceptability of
forms of governance is the "Criterion of Personal Choice."2 416 By this,

Dahl means that any individual member of society will tend to prefer a
social decisionmaking process that results as often as possible in outcomes that correspond to the individual's personal preferences.247 Dahl
points out, however, that the Criterion of Personal Choice clearly cannot be satisfied for everyone in every instance, and some kind of compromise must be accepted if life in organized society is to continue. If
individual political influence is measured as the ability to secure desired
political outcomes, then every regime gives its citizens a degree of influence ranging from no influence at all-as, for example, under a dictatorship-to complete control-as where the citizen constitutes a polity of one. 248 This analysis allows us to reformulate the question: if
2'46ROBERTA. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?

6-9 (rev. ed. 1990).

See id. at 6.
248 For purposes of this discussion, I distinguish between the citizenry and the gov211

ernment. Thus, I will not consider a dictatorship to be a political arrangement in which
one citizen has all the power and the other citizens have none. In so doing, I follow a
fairly standard convention in political theory of distinguishing between the interests of
government officials as officials and their interests as citizens. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS, bk. III, ch. 7, at 1279a-1279b (Ernest Barker, trans., Oxford University Press
1995) (distinguishing among forms of government depending on whether the rulers
pursue the common good or their own personal interest); THE FEDERALIST NOs. 10, 51
(James Madison) (postulating the pursuit of private interest as an inevitable prelude to
attempts to institute governmental tyranny); see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION (1958) (tracing development ofa private realm distinct from public life).
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protective democracy is to protect adequately, at what point on the
spectrum between no control and absolute control over the substance
of political decisionmaking is the line ofcompromise to be drawn?
At this point, it is tempting to make the following response: an
"adequate" share of political influence is an equal share.219 Yet the
move to equality does not answer the question posed, for there is no
particular reason to suppose that an equal share of political influence
will necessarily be an adequate share. A forty-ounce cake may provide
each of ten people with a four-ounce slice, but it does not follow that a
four-ounce slice of cake is nutritionally adequate. As in cooking, so in
politics: to say that political influence must be distributed equally' says
nothing about how much influence is adequate to protect the rights
and liberties of the citizenry25' For example, in an absolute monarchy,
ordinary citizens may have no influence at all on political decisionmaking. Their influence is equal-no one has any-but it is not adequate
under any definition of adequacy that an American is likely to give.
Similarly, Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, but the monarch rules subject to
a tradition of freely granting audiences to individual subjects.ns If acIn Dahl's account, the turn to political equality follows naturally from the recognition that the Criterion of Personal Choice cannot be satisfied for everyone. See DAHL,
supranote 246, at 8-9.
2w Inequality ofpolitical influence is a concern only on the assumption that political
influence must be distributed equally, an assumption by no means universally shared,
even among advocates of democracy. For example, John Stuart Mill, a fierce advocate of
universal suffrage under a regime of proportional representation, argued that the welleducated should be given extra votes to reflect their greater ability to contribute to good
political decisionmaking. See MILL, supra note 45, at 334-37. Of course, there are substantial traditions in political philosophy arguing for the distribution of political influence on the basis ofvirtues that are concedediy unequally distributed throughout society.
See, eg., ARISTOTLE, supranote 248, at bks. HI-IV; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bks. II-III.
Nevertheless, the assumption of human equality seems so fundamental to American
political culture that an implicit equality requirement may be granted without controversy. The Declaration of Independence proclaims the equality of individuals a selfevident truth. SeeTHE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Derivations
ofequality can be found in the work of many natural rights theorists, such as Hobbes and
Locke. See THoMAS HOBBES, LE IATHAN pt. I, ch.13 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651);
LOCKE, supra note 49, at ch. II.
2 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) (arguing
that the rhetoric of equality should be abandoned as an explanatory norm); cf. C.B.
MACPHERSON, Problems of a Non-Market Theoiy of Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 39,55 (1973) (any fully democratic theory must assert that "the
rights ofany man which are morally justifiable on any egalitarian principle are only those
which allow all others to have equal effective rights; and that those areenough" to achieve
democracy's goals).
2
See DouglasJehl, In Uneasy Time, SaudiPrinceProvides a Hope ofStability, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 19, 1996, atAl.
249
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cess to these audiences is equal, and Saudi citizens can use their audiences to influence the King's decisions, then Saudi citizens have an
amount of political influence that is equal, and which exceeds that of
citizens of monarchies in which audiences are not granted, yet which
Americans would surely consider inadequate.
Moving from monarchy to democracy does not alleviate this indeterminacy problem. A form of government might be democratic, but
provide for legislative terms of twenty-five years. Legislators who are unlikely to stand for reelection in their lifetimes might be thought insufficiently responsive to the popular will to provide the people with adequate influence over the political process.2 s Similarly, legislators in a
democracy might or might not hold office subject to a requirement to
obey instructions from their constituents. The people's influence over
a Burkean legislature that rejects instructions in favor of the legislators'
independent judgment might be thought by some to provide citizens
with influence that is equal, but inadequate.
These examples make two things clear. First, protective democracy
itself cannot determine the degree of political influence that provides
citizens with an adequate level of protection. Protective democracy
supplies a purpose for governmental organization, but not the form of
organization. Second, the amount of protection that is adequate cannot be determined independently of the decision to adopt a particular
form of government, thereby incorporating a particular method of exercising political influence. Indeed, when the assumptions of protective democracy are brought into play, the decision to adopt any particular form of government necessarily reflects a prior determination about
the degree of citizen influence that is appropriate. In other words,
when we operate within a framework of protective democracy, we
choose a form of government because we think it provides citizens with
an adequate degree of political influence and protection. Creating a
particular political process thus establishesthe amount of influence to be
deemed adequate. Once that decision is made and a particular political process installed, citizens simply have such means of influencing the
political process as the system by design provides, and the only remaining question is whether those means have in fact been appropriately
distributed. The means of influence themselves, however, are deemed
n3 The Framers certainly thought so, which is why they stressed concepts such as frequent elections to the House of Representatives, rotation in office, and staggered senatorial terms. For an overview, see Neil Gorsuch &Michael Guzman, Wi/l the C-entlemen P/ease
Yield? A Defense of the ConstitutionalityofState-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HOFsTRA L. REV.
341,345-53 (1991).

1997]

A RECONSIDERATION OFTHERIGHT TO VOTE

adequate by definition.2
It follows that those who criticize a particular system of government
for providing them with inadequate political influence can be saying
one of two things. First, they may be criticizing the society's choice of
governmental organization on the ground that it is badly designed in
that it does not provide its citizens with an adequate amount of political
influence. We may call this an "inadequate influence" claim. Second,
they may be conceding the adequacy of political influence offered by
the chosen system, but claiming that whatever means of influence that
the system by design provides have been in practice denied to them.
We may call this a "denial of influence" claim. In an inadequate influence claim, citizens criticize their political influence in absolute terms
by comparing it to the amount of influence they would have under
some other form of government offering some other, stronger opportunities to influence political outcomes. In a denial of influence claim,
citizens criticize their political influence only relatively, by comparing
the amount of political influence they actually have to the amount to
which the existing political system entitles them.
Let us see how these kinds of claims might show up in voting rights
litigation. The first thing to observe is that voting rights plaintiffs are
highly unlikely to bring an inadequate influence claim directly. To
claim that the existing political system provides citizens with an inadequate degree of political influence over the government is to criticize a
foundational choice of governmental organization. Such choices are
just the kind made by constitutions, and one can hardly expect to get a
sympathetic judicial hearing on an overt claim that the Constitution
makes a poor choice that should be judicially displaced.25
Asking how much political influence is adequate is not unlike asking what counts
as an "adequate" chance to win the lottery. Everyone who plays the lottery must have an
equal chance to win because equality of chance is part of how we define lotteries. But
knowing that everyone must have an equal chance to win says nothing about the kind of
lottery that should be chosen. For example, we might choose a lottery format that offers
low payoffs to many winners because we think, for reasons entirely independent of the
lottery structure, that an "adequate" chance of winning the lottery means a comparatively
decent chance to win something, no matter how small. Or we might choose a high-odds,
high-payoff system because we think an "adequate" chance to win means any chance, no
matter how slim, to win a very large sum. In either case, to choose a particular lottery
format is to define the adequacy of the chance. Once that choice is made, those who
criticize the lottery for offering them an inadequate chance to win are criticizing the
original choice of lottery format rather than their own treatment under the chosen system.
2 On the other hand, such a claim might well be addressed to a legislature if legislatures are constitutionally free to provide citizens with more influence than the state or
federal constitutional minimum. See infraPart IH.B.2.a.

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVEW

946

(Vol. 145: 893

This is not to say that inadequate influence claims can never be
brought, only that they must be disguised. Typically, such a claim will
be couched as a contention about the kind of political system the Constitution actually implements. We would thus expect a litigant to
mount this type of argument by making a claim about what the constitutionally mandated system "really" is-for example, that the Constitution, properly understood, establishes universal suffrage, or a mandatory system of proportional representation. Presumably, among the
reasons that might be offered to support such a conclusion would be
the argument that the Constitution, as interpreted by the plaintiff, provides an adequate degree of political influence to all citizens. Such an
argument rests on an inference that interpretations of the Constitution
providing citizens with more influence are to be preferred over those
providing them with less influence2r
A denial-of-influence claim, on the other hand, would concede the
constitutionally established political system as given, but argue on due
process or equal protection grounds 7 that the tools of political influence provided under that system have been unfairly denied to some.
For example, denial-of-influence plaintiffs might claim that the constitutional system includes a general entitlement to the franchise, yet they
have been denied the vote.m Or they might claim that the Constitution
requires a state's chief executive to be popularly elected, but the state
provides only for legislative appointment of the Governor.25 Another
such claim might be that the constitutional scheme requires allocation
of the franchise to those directly governed by an elected body, but that
the franchise has not been so extended.2 6
These examples also show that the two kinds of voting rights claims
have a tendency to converge. This is because the denial-of-influence
argument, like the inadequate influence argument, requires the litigant
to take a position about the means of political influence that are actu-

This is an appealing inference, but one the Court has rejected.. See infra Part
II.B.2.
27 It can be seen from this analysis that a denial of influence claim is best conceived
as a due process claim. To treat it as an equal protection claim would involve comparing
the plaintiff's claim not to a substantive standard of influence set by the Constitution, but
to the amount of influence in fact allocated to others. This issue is treated further below.
See infraPart III.D.
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.

24 (1974).
M
210

See, e.g., Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
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ally provided by the constitutionally established political system. For
example, denial-of-influence plaintiffs might concede that the Constitution provides for (or allows) winner-take-all districted elections, but argue that such a system, properly understood, "really" entities them to a
district in which they will be able to elect a representative of their
choice. 6'
2. The Logic of Protective Democracy Exemplified: Three Theorists
At this point, it may be useful to illustrate the logic of protective
democracy claims with a few more thorough examples. In this Section,
I shall focus on the arguments of three theorists who work much of the
time within the protective democracy tradition: John Stuart Mill, Kathryn Abrams and Lani Guinier.
In addition to fleshing out the conceptual logic of protective democracy, the following discussion also demonstrates one of the advantages of locating claims about the right to vote in the broader context of
theories of democracy- the ability to put seemingly disparate thinkers
into direct dialogue with one another. Many of the most prominent
debates in voting rights theory give the impression of clashes between
wholly different and, in some cases, incommensurable conceptions of
voting. Is the right to cast a ballot, standing alone, a meaningful right?
Does the right to vote include a right to representation? Can a vote be
considered effective even if it never results in governmental adoption of
substantive policies preferred by the voter? Affirmative and negative
positions on all these issues are easy to come by. Approaching the right
to vote by way of democratic theory often allows us to make sense of
these seemingly intractable debates by permitting theorists to engage,
metaphorically speaking, in a more direct dialogue. This, in turn, has
the valuable benefit of permitting a more precise identification of the
real grounds of disagreement among them.
Examination of these theorists' views reveals that what divides them
is not their theoretical beliefs about the purpose or significance of democracy, but their empirical assumptions about the ways in which political influence is exercised within a democratic regime. Protective
democracy is premised on the need to protect, but the mechanisms by
which citizens protect their interests necessarily depend upon the structure and operation of government. What secures influence in one regime may not do so in another. Ultimately, these theorists disagree

2W

But see, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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only on the mechanisms by which citizens influence the workings of
government. Whether their claims fall into the inadequate influence
or denial-of-influence category thus depends on whether they believe
the means for exercising adequate influence are already in place.
a. Mill: Influence by PersonalPersuasion
John Stuart Mill is a good example of a theorist who makes an undisguised claim of inadequate influence under a regime of protective
262
democracy.
For Mill, the right to vote must mean the right to elect a
representative to a legislature seated under a system of proportional
Mill's claim is clearly one of inadequate influence
representation.
because it is an overt criticism of the British electoral system and a direct plea for change.6 Mill's conception of the right to vote does not
rest on some metaphysical conception of the essential nature of voting,
representation or democracy. Rather, working from a straightforward,
traditional theory of protective democracy, Mill reaches his conclusions
as a direct consequence of his assumptions about the way in which political influence is exercised in a democratic republic. In Mill's view,
citizens exercise political influence by electing representatives who then
attempt in the legislature to advance their constituents' beliefs.
Mill begins his defense of proportional representation with a flat rejection of the possibility of virtual representation: "the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded,
when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to
stand up for them.S"
It follows that the "ideally best form of government" is a pure democracy in which citizens personally stand up for
themselves. 266 Where pure democracy is impracticable, however, it falls
to a person's representative to "stand up for" his or her interests.
Nevertheless, Mill is quite clear that standing up for one's interests
is not the same as obtaining what one wants. He acknowledges that
262

It may seem paradoxical to label Mill, usually taken to be a leading exponent of

deliberative democracy, see supranote 45, as a protective democracy theorist. In fact, as
will become evident below, Mill's approach does not partake exclusively of either theory,
but relies extensively on both. Here, I focus on the aspects of his thought that rely most
heavily on traditions of protective democracy.
263 See MILL, supra note 45, at 303 ("In a really equal democracy, every
or any section would be represented not disproportionately but proportionately.").
2 See id. at 246-47 (disapproving the exclusion of the working classes, and their
perspectives, from the English Parliament).
215 Id. at 245. For a useful discussion of why Mill's utilitarianism leads him
to this
conclusion, see PrKIN, supranote 38, at 202-06.
MILL, supranote 45, at 244.

19971

A RECONSIDERATIONOFTHE RIGHT TO VOTE

government requires some form of majority rule; it is perfectly proper,
he says, that "the majority of the people, through their representatives,
will outvote and prevail over the minority and their representatives." 6
Consequently, democracy is incapable of protecting all interests of all
people at all times. 6s It does not follow, however, that democratic government is consistent with the majority "blotting out the smaller number altogether." 2

,

If democracy is to serve its elemental function of

protecting the interests of the citizenry, it must afford citizens at least
the opportunity, through their representatives, to stand up for themselves.
This position leads Mill to advocate a strict form of proportional
representation, and to condemn as "false democracy" the kind of winPeople with
ner-take-all system with which Americans are familiar.
rights must have those rights represented-stood up for-in the legislature itself. For this reason, Mill goes on to contend, in the strongest
possible language, that those who vote for the losing candidate in a
winner-take-all election are entirely "unrepresented."27
Mill's position is vulnerable to a ready criticism: if the purpose of
democracy is to protect the rights and interests of citizens, ofwhat use is
a voice in collective decisionmaking if one's voice is never heeded?
How are my rights better protected by having a representative who is
constantly outvoted in legislative decisionmaking than by having no
representative at all? Mill seems to condemn false democracy only to
offer a form of false representation.
Mill's response to this criticism rests on his belief that deliberation
has the power to alter decisions. Although the minority, he concedes,
"will necessarily be outnumbered, it makes a great difference whether
or not they are heard."2 7 The majority may always outvote the minority,
but
,G7Id. at 303.

As political scientist Robert Dahl puts it, the desire of all citizens to get what they
want-what Dahl calls the "Criterion ofPersonal Choice"--is in tension with the need to
live in society. SeeDAHL, supra note 246, at 6-9.
219 MILL, supranote 45, at 303.
210 See id.at 303-07.
271 Id.at 305.
2'

2n Id.at 313. It is not entirely clear whether Mill believes that a hearing always makes
a difference, or whether that is the case only under the kind of proportional representation proposed by Hare which, in Mill's view, would tend to result in the selection of intelligent and virtuous representatives. See id. at 310-14. Mill's argument that the minority
must be afforded a voice might lose some force if the minority's representatives were
foolish, corrupt or inarticulate.
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they would speak and vote in their presence, and subject to their criticism. When any difference arose, they would have to meet the arguments of the instructed few, by reasons, at least apparently, as cogent;
and since they could not, as those do who are speaking to persons already unanimous, simply assume that they are in the right, it would occasionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in the
wrong. As they would in general be well-meaning .... their own minds
would be insensibly raised by the influence of the minds with which they
were in contact, or even in conflict.2

Thus, for Mill, representation protects the represented by giving them a
voice and an opportunity to convince others, even if the attempt to persuade is ineffective.
Mill's analysis contains a significant internal tension, for he may be
read to call not for the representation of individuals or groups, but for
the representation of viewpoints. On this reading of Mill, what ultimately protects a citizen's rights is the airing of the citizen's point of
view in the legislature. As Hanna Pitkin has pointed out, however,
"although there must be a representative for 'every worthwhile opinion,' the number of representatives from each particular opinion is essentially irrelevant. If representing means presenting a point of view,
one spokesman is as good as ten." 74 Thus, the representative who presents the citizen's views need not be one for whom the citizen actually
voted, nor must the citizen's views be represented in numbers sufficient
to implement those views, or even in numbers proportional to the extent to which they are held. Consequently, the right to representation
offered by Mill does not entitle groups or individuals to electoral success or even electoral influence, much less proportional representation,
so long as some member of the legislature is willing to bring up the pertinent viewpoints at some point during the legislative debates.
This tension may be resolved by reading Mill's position more
strongly. Mill's rejection ofvirtual representation and his stress on selfpromotion of citizens' interests may be taken to reveal an underlying
belief that only a person's "own" representative-that is, one for whom
the person has actually voted and over whom he or she thus exercises
direct electoral influence-can be relied upon to raise, argue and defend the person's point of views in a satisfactory way. Thus, for Mill, the
content of the right to vote in a properly constituted republic flows

273

Id.at 314.
supra note 38, at 83-84 (quoting A. Phillips Griffiths and Richard Woll-

274 PITmI,

heim, How Can One Person Represent Another?, 34 AisroTELAN Soc'Y SUPP. 187, 212
(1960)).
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from the twin beliefs that representatives are adequately responsive only
to those to whom they owe their election, and that an adequately motivated representative is capable of persuading other members of the legislature of the point of view of his or her constituents.
b. Abrams: Multiple Channels ofInfluence
One of Mill's key assumptions is that legislators are adequately responsive only to those to whom they directly owe their election. Yet the
accuracy of this assumption is hardly self-evident; in view of the condition of politics in the contemporary United States, Mill's assumption
seems charmingly naive. If not in Mill's society then in ours, there are
many ways to influence elected officials: these include, for example,
letter-writing, grass-roots organizing and, most effective of all, the judicious dissemination of money.7 Indeed, it is scarcely necessary to have
the vote at all nowadays, for the best-represented interests on Capitol
Hill and in state capitols are surely the interests of corporations and
businesses that are not even eligible to vote. Even foreign nations with
well-financed lobbying campaigns are often better represented today in
the Millian sense than are American citizens whose only resource is
their votes.Y
If we relax Mill's assumption about the means by which citizens influence their representatives, we may simultaneously relax his conclusions about the necessary content of the right to vote. This is the approach taken by Kathryn Abrams in her writings on the Voting Rights
Act. 7 According to Abrams, the Act's focus on the success of minority
275

The role of money in politics has been well-documented. See, e.g., HERBERT E.

ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITIcs: MONEY ELEcrIONs, AND POLITICAL REFOPM (4th ed.
1992); DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY 195-221 (1975). The
contribution disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act are predicated
on the assumption that money talks. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (per
curiam). For a recent overview of the topic, see Symposium on CampaignFinanceRefom, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1125 (1994).
2 This kind of charge is sometimes levelled at Israel, whose interests are said to be
asserted directly in Congress through American lobbying organizations. See, e.g., David K.
Shipler, On Midd&East Policy,A MajorInfluence,N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1987, at 1 (stating that
the American Israel Affairs Committee Organization "has gained the power to influence
a Presidential candidate's choice of staff, to block practically any arms sale to an Arab
country and to serve as a catalyst for intimate military relations between the Pentagon
and the Israeli Army");Jacob Weisberg, The Lobby with a Lock on Congress,NEWsWEEK, Oct

19, 1987, at 46 (stating that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee "has developed
a touch so soft that members of Congress now hardly realize they are being lobbied" and
that "sometimes the organization doesn't have to lobby at all").
2n SeeAbrams, supranote 45; Kathryn Abrams, Relationshipsof Representation in Voting
RightsActJurisprudenc 71 TX. L. REV. 1409 (1993). In the following discussion I have
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groups in electing representatives is misguided because electoral success is a "misleadingly simple measure of political effectiveness."2 8 Citizens' political goals "are accomplished not simply by pulling a lever, but
by engaging in activities such as discussion, lobbying, and coalitionbuilding with others."27' These opportunities to influence the outcome
of the political process occur throughout an extended and continuous
process, ranging from preelection engagement in political dialogue
and attempts to persuade other voters, through post-election attempts
to influence the outcome of the legislative process. 280
Unlike Mill, however, Abrams believes that our system of government is already structured to provide these numerous and adequate opportunities for political influence. Consequently, her analysis is geared
toward supporting denial-of-influence claims rather than claims of inadequate influence. Abrams's beliefs about the ways in which our system in fact distributes political influence dictate the kinds of denial-ofinfluence claims her theory would support. Abrams's theory should
not, for example, consider the right to vote to be denied by the mere
failure to provide proportional representation (or some similar kind of
electoral success) to minority groups. Rather, the right to vote should
be denied in her system, only if groups or individuals are also shut out
of pre-voting and post-voting processes.
These assumptions are borne out in Abrams's conception of the
right to vote, which is both broader and narrower than Mill's. It is
broader in that it encompasses a right "to participate in all of the predicate activities that precede and follow the vote." 28 1 Thus, the right to
vote is broad enough to encompass, for example, the rights to speak, to
categorized Abrams as relying primarily on a theory of protective democracy. To be fair,
there is a strand in her work that, in its reliance on the dialogic and community-building
nature of politics, has a distinct flavor of deliberative democracy. See, e.g., Abrams, supra
note 45, at 475-76,489 n.217 (suggesting that legislative reform may make taking a role in
self-government and political change more valuable to members of the minority community, thus increasing "the investigation or clarification of shared objects," a goal that
Abrams views "as indisputably deliberative"). However, the deliberative democracy aspects ofAbrams's writings seem to do relatively little substantive work-that is, they do
not much seem to influence her conclusions. Put another way, Abrams's substantive
conception of the right to vote would not change much if she relied solely on the protective benefits of political participation and ignored what she occasionally treats as the deliberative or dialogic benefits of participation. Indeed, Abrams herself notes that "[i]t
does not appear.., that Congress considered the benefits of direct political participation
in passing either the Voting Rights Act or the 1982 amendments." Id.at 476 n.173.
278 Abrams, supra note 45, at 452.
271 Id.at 452-53.

See id. at 474-75, 480.
2" Id. at 504.
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associate with others for political purposes, and to lobby government
officials. 2 On the other hand, Abrams's conception of the right to vote
is also narrower than Mill's in that it need not include the kind of right
to electoral success implicit in an entitlement to proportional representation. Merely "being outnumbered" in an American-style winner-takeall district, Abrams contends, "is not a cause for complaint" so long as
the minority may from time to time "successfully assert its influence" on
elections or policies-for example, "by coalescing with others" in the
district.
c. Guinier: Influence in a RaciallyPolarizedSociety
Another assumption critical to Mill's conception of the right to vote
is that persuasion in the legislative chamber is both possible and effective. Yet in a legislature representing a highly polarized society, attempts to persuade the opposition may be futile. Moreover, even when
persuasion is possible, it must not occur so incrementally or over such a
long period that its protective potential becomes meaningless. When a
majority threatens immediately to invade irreparably some fundamental
right of the minority, the possibility of persuading the majority to reverse itselfat some time in the distant future is small consolation.
Lani Guinier takes as her basic premise the complete failure of this
critical Millian assumption. 2 " At the core of Guinier's work is a forceful
critique of the notion that having a voice in legislative decisionmaking
meaningfully protects the rights and interests of minorities. Guinier
sees contemporary American society as deeply divided along racial
lines, with each group so entrenched in its positions that Millian dialogue and persuasion is highly unlikely, and perhaps impossible.28
Under these circumstances, representation alone accomplishes little; it
merely shifts the venue of exclusion from the electorate to the legisla-

282

See id. at 480. These particular rights already receive significant constitutional pro-

tection, of course, under the First Amendment. See e,g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479,
482 (1985) (noting that the First Amendment guarantees "that people 'may communicate their will' through direct petitions to the legislature and government officials"
(quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 738 (1789))); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam) (stating that the First Amendment protects political expression, including expressions in the form ofcampaign contributions).
Abrams, supranote 45, at 506.
28 In the following discussion, I rely primarily on GUINIER, TYRANNY,
supra note 29.
Her most recent writings may reflect additional evolution in some aspects of her views.
See, e.g., Guinier, [Elracingsupranote 33; Guinier, MoreDemocracy,supranote 45.
See, e.g., GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 29, at 3,9,34,37,60,70, 103.
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28

ture. 6
Guinier is impatient with those who advocate proportional minority
representation on communitarian grounds. To be sure, she is sympathetic to the possibility that some black Americans derive "psychological
value" from the election of "similarly situated representatives,"2 7 and
recognizes that this kind of representation might "fulfill the black
community's need for self-affirmation through 'role models." 2ss Nonetheless, Guinier, at bottom, believes this point of view excessively romantic, 2' 9 and its advocates blind to the fact that the store is being
plundered on the legislative floorY What counts for Guinier is bottom-line protection of minority rights and interests, and so long as racial minorities are consistently out-voted where it counts-in the legislature itself-minority presence in the legislature is mere "tokenism."29 '
For Guinier, then, representation protects rights and interests only
when it results in political action that conforms to the preferences of
the represented. The substance of the decision counts far more than
the process by which it was reached. Consequently, the point of reference against which Guinier constantly orients herself is 2the
2
"transformative social agenda" of the original civil rights movement. Unlike Abrams, who conceives of the right to vote as stopping short
of the right to elect a chosen representative, and Mill, who believes that
the right to proportional representation exhausts the right to vote,
Guinier contends that the right to direct legislative representation is
the minimum that an effective right to vote entails. For Guinier, the
right to vote embraces guarantees of interest representation within the
legislature itself,9 3 including, in the right circumstances, "imposition of
internal remedial constraints on the decisional process."9 4 These
might include modifying the legislative process to include cumulative
voting or supermajority requirements.2
Guinier's most extreme suggestion seems to be that various groups be given the opportunity to

2'6 See id. at

61-69.

217 Id.at

55.
28 Id.at56.
219See id. at 42 (asserting that the reigning theory of black electoral success

"romanticizes black elected officials as empowerment role models").
280 See id.at 58, 61-65.
' Id. at 41.
m' Id.at 44-48, 69.
2" Seeid at 101-14.
SId. at 106.
2'sSee id- at 107-08.
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"take turns" at setting the substance of government policy, 6a suggestion that apparently involves discarding altogether the assumption that
the purpose of politics is to discover or decide upon the content
9 7of a
achievement.
its
toward
society
direct
to
and
good
common
single
During the controversy over her nomination to be Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Guinier was widely attacked for advancing
radical, controversial views about democracy.298 This criticism is misguided; if Guinier's views are controversial, it is for a very different reason. What leads Guinier to her conception of the right to vote is not a
unique or revolutionary view of the nature and purpose of democracy,
but a set ofempirical beliefs about the ways in which citizens in the contemporary United States actually exercise political influence. For
Guinier, political influence is for the most part exercised, to put it
bluntly, by a white, largely racist majority that manipulates electoral
processes to perpetuate its power and then rams its policies through the
legislative process without any input from, and if necessary over the objections of, a racial minority.9 Under these circumstances, protective
democracy is hard-pressed to provide much protection for minority
rights and liberties without an extremely robust conception of voting
rights.
.• •
300
Despite some occasional disclaimers, Guinier seems, for the most
part, to contend that the existing framework of government, properly
understood in the ways she describes, presently entitles minoritiesto
the kinds of changes she advocates. She makes such a claim possible by
approaching the Voting Rights Act at a very high level of abstraction,
characterizing its purpose as the achievement of "political empowerment" and "political fairness" through the recognition of "group voting
rights."39 ' She then argues that the prevailing interpretation of the Act
See id.at 2-7.
2"This assumption goes back in Western thought at least as far as the ancient
29

Greeks. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supranote 248, at 1278b, 1279b (emphasizing the common
good of the citizenry as the proper aim of government). Professor Richard Briffault also
notes the impracticability of some of Guinier's suggestions. SeeBriffault, supranote 31, at
465 (noting that cumulative voting and supermajority requirements do not guarantee

legislative results).
2" Good summaries ofthe controversy can be found in Stephen L. Carter, Forewordto
GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 29, at vii-xx, and in Pamela S. Karlan, Democracy and Dis-

Appointment, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1289-96 (1995).
See, eg., GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 29, at 9-10, 63, 103, 118.
o See, eg., id.at 109 (characterizing her purpose as "primarily aspirational"); id. at 73
(characterizing her proposed remedies as "a heuristic to demonstrate the potential unfairness" ofsome voting systems).
'

Id.at 92-93.
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is incapable of achieving these statutory purposes, 0 2 and that only by
reinterpreting03sit in the way she proposes can the Act be made to fulfill
its own goals

This is a classic example of a denial-of-influence claim. Guinier's
argument is that our existing system of government allocates a certain
level of political influence to groups and individuals, but that this influence has been denied in practice to racial minorities by a combination
of racial polarization and the use of electoral mechanisms that diminish

the influence of political minorities.
B. The DisattractionsofProtectiveDemocracy Claims
The foregoing discussion reveals at least two aspects of protective
democracy-based voting rights claims that might make them unattractive to the Supreme Court. First, the resolution of protective democracy-based claims would require the Court to make firm decisions about
the degree of political influence to which citizens are entitled under
the Constitution, something it is loath to do. Second, there is a distinct
possibility that if the Court were to overcome its reluctance to engage
these issues and undertake the task of expounding the constitutional
structure of political influence, the outcome might well be highly unsatisfying according to contemporary standards of democracy-so much
so that the Court may wish to avoid the subject altogether.
so2 See id.at 77-91.
"-sA more direct route to the same result is to argue that the Constitution is concerned with both race and democracy, but that the achievement of racial justice takes
priority over the maintenance of strictly democratic institutions. Some scholars have
taken positions along these lines. See, e.g., Karlan, Undoingthe Right Thing supra note 29,
at 40 ("A government's interest in strict majoritarianism and its own preferred electoral
forms are trumped by what section 2 identifies as a more compelling, immediate concern-political opportunity for minority voters."); see alsoAlan Howard & Bruce Howard,
The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the Emerging PoliticalEquality Norm, 83
COLUM. L REV. 1615 (1983) (arguing that constitutional interests in democracy and racial equality are in conflict and that ways should be found to accommodate both). For a
direct argument in favor of prioritizing concerns for democracy over racial concerns, see
Butler, supranote 37, at 357-62.
Guinier, however, has for the most part tried to avoid justifying her voting rights
claims predominantly on racial grounds, anchoring them instead on arguments about
democratic processes. She seems quite correct when she argues that her solutions will
help everyone, notjust racial minorities. See, e.g., GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 29, at 149
(cumulative voting will "give more voters, not just racial minorities, the opportunity to
vote for a winning candidate"); see also Arthur Eisenberg, The Millian Thoughts of Lani
Guinier,21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 617, 626 (1994) (book review) ("[Guinier] labors to fashion a system that is fairer to all who hold minority viewpoints regardless of
race or ethnicity.").
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1. Reluctance to Commit to a Constitutional Structure
of Political Influence

We have seen that in both inadequate influence claims and denialof-influence claims, plaintiffs argue that the Constitution requires
American political institutions to take forms that provide citizens with
specific avenues by which to obtain particular levels of political influence over government officials. The unavoidable logic of a protective
democracy-based voting rights claim thus compels a court to decide
specific details of the constitutional structure of political influence.
These are just the kinds of questions that the Supreme Court has historically been reluctant to decide.
The Court's reluctance is based primarily on doubts about its competence to resolve the kinds of questions posed by protective democracy claims, and consequent questions about the appropriate limits of
the judicial role. For example, the most significant manifestation of the
Court's reluctance in this area is undoubtedly its refusal to construe the
Guarantee Clause. s 4 This clause, which commits the United States to
assuring the states a "republican" form of government, is one of the
likeliest constitutional sources for protective democracy rights against
states and localities.3s The very notion of republican government presupposes a system of representation subject to some degree of popular
electoral control over the representatives. As Justice Douglas once observed, "the right to vote is inherent in the republican form of government envisaged by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution."0 As we
have seen, however, elections by themselves do not necessarily implement meaningful popular control-who votes, for what, and under
07
what circumstances are critically important factors."
Consequently, the
meaning of the guarantee cannot be determined without making at

304 U.S.

CoNsT. art. rV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form ofGovernment....").
35 See ELY, supranote 177, at 118 n.* (noting that the right to vote "is most naturally
assignable to the Republican Form Clause"); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The CentralMeaning ofRepublican Government: PopularSovereignty, MajorityRule, and the DenominatorProblem,

65 U. COLO. L REV. 749, 762-66 (1994) (arguing that the core value protected by the
clause is popular sovereignty as embodied in majority rule); Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basisfor FederalProsecutionsof State andLocal Officials, 62 S. CAL. L REV.
369, 415-70 (1989) (arguing that the clause can be a source of power for the prosecution
of official corruption at all levels of government); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause andStateAutonomy: Federalismfora ThirdCentuy,88 CoLUM. L REV. 1,25-26 (1988)
(arguing that the clause limits the ability of states to restrict popular representation).
s Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242 (1962) (Douglas,J., concurring).
307 See supraPart MAI.

958

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 145: 893

least some minimal judgments about the efficacy of particular democratic institutions.
Nevertheless, for nearly 150 years the Court has held the Guarantee
Clause nonjusticiable. In Luther v. Borden, decided in 1849, the Court
held that resolution of a conflict between two groups, each claiming to
be the legitimate government of Rhode Island, raised a political question under the Guarantee Clause which the Court was powerless to decide. 30 The Court has since adhered fairly consistently to the position
that Guarantee Clause issues are nonjusticable 3s
Another aspect of the Court's reticence is exemplified by its wariness in entering what it has called, in Justice Frankfurter's well-known
phrase, the "political thicket." '0 In his dissent in Bakerv. Carts" Justice
Frankfurter went on to argue that the federal courts should not be in
the business of "choos[ing] among competing theories of political philosophy" for the purpose of deciding "an appropriate frame of government" for the states. s Although Justice Frankfurter's position has
never captured a majority of the Court, his message has nevertheless
had a lasting impact in the form of heightened judicial caution.313 For
48 U.S. 1, 46 (1849).
See, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150-51 (1912)
(holding nonjusticable a Guarantee Clause challenge to a state constitutional amendment); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding nonjusticable a Guarantee
Clause challenge to state apportionment); Baker,369 U.S. at 208-10 (reaffirming in dicta
that cases brought under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticable). But see Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-76 (1874) (refusing to recognize suffrage rights for
women under the Guarantee Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-85
(1992) (noting the disagreement as to whether the Guarantee Clause implicates nonjusticable political questions and concluding that "[w]e need not resolve this difficult question today").

The Court's position has been forcefully criticized. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 177, at
118 n.* (criticizing the Court's subsequent generalization of Lutherto hold that all invocations ofclaims under the clause as "rooted in a category mistake" and "a gross mistake
of logic"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Underthe GuaranteeClause ShouldBeJustidablk 65 U.
CoLo. L REV. 849, 852 (1994) ("[I]t is time for the Guarantee Clause to be resurrected
and given a meaningful role in contemporary constitutional law."); Merritt, supranote
305, at 70-78.
310 Colegrove,328 U.S. at 556.
s" 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
s1 Id.at 300 (FrankfurterJ., dissenting).
s"s The present spokesperson for the Frankfurter view is Justice Thomas. See Holder
v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2596 (1994) (ThomasJ, concurring) ("[M]atters of political theory are beyond the ordinary sphere of federal judges. And that is precisely the point.
The matters the Court has set out to resolve in vote dilution cases are questions of political philosophy, not questions oflaw.").
This contemporary reticence to confront problems of "political theory" seems especially strange in light of the much olderjudicial tradition of directly grappling with issues
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example, in Gaffney v. Cummings,14 the Court declined to hold that minor deviations from strict mathematical equality among state legislative
districts made out a prima facie case of unconstitutional malapportionment. The Court's prior forays into the political thicket, it said, did
not commit it to 15getting "bogged down in a vast, intractable apportionment slough."0
2. Lack of a Constitutional Right to Vote
If the Court generally prefers to avoid committing itself on constitutional issues of political structure, there is a second, more specific reason why it might prefer not to consider the substance of protective democracy claims: the answers might prove unpleasant. Although the
Court's habitual reluctance to elucidate the constitutional structure of
political influence complicates the analysis, there are good grounds for
interpreting what little the Court has said to mean that the United
States Constitution provides its citizens with no significant mandatory
level of political influence through voting.3 16 In other words, the Constitution does not contain any substantive right to vote. The Framers'
of political theory. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-22
(1819); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 421 (1793). This is especially true given the
Court's ready superimposition ofa political theory on the First Amendment, under which
the right to free speech is deemed a right ofpolitical influence. See, e.g., NewYork Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Moreover, Justice Thomas's disclaimers seem disingenuous in light of the fact that he obviously has a political theory of the Constitution,
one that is narrower than the theories underlying the vote dilution cases and the Voting
Rights Act. See Guinier, [Elradng,supra note 33, at 121-22 (arguing thatJustice Thomas's
theory of the political structure ofthe Constitution is one in which itgrants universal suffrage and nothing more); Bierstein, supra note 37, at 1519 (noting that in Holder,
"Thomas treated 'political theory' as if it were a dangerous animal, to be avoided at all
costs.... It never seemed to occur to Thomas that the Constitution and the Voting
Rights Act represent political theory choices, which it is then the Court's obligation to
interpret and enforce").
412 U.S. 735 (1973).
Id.
at 750. Justice Frankfurter's admonition has also affected individualJustices on
individual occasions. For example, Justice Stevens invoked Frankfurter's warning tojustify his concurrence in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 93 (1980) (Stevens,J.,concurring).
Justice Stevens argued that an otherwise valid state or local decision to employ a multimember district could not be invalidated merely because some decision makers supported it for improper reasons. To adopt such an approach, he said, would "entangle the
judiciary in a voracious political thicket." Id.
316 In contrast, the Court has held that the Constitution does provide
citizens with a
mandatory level of political influence through speaking the First Amendment almost
uniformly prohibits government censorship of speech designed to support a political position. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (finding that a newspaper's allegation of a candidate's past
criminal conduct is relevant to a candidate's fitness for office).
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suspicion of popular democracy combined with their willingness to
compromise on issues of federal structure may have undermined any
possibility that the Constitution implements a regime of meaningful
protective democracy. 317
a. The Minimal GuaranteeofRepublican Government
A useful place to begin to get the flavor of the constitutional treatment of political rights is the Guarantee Clause. I have said that this
provision is the most obvious source for the kinds of rights that would
make protective democracy meaningful. Suppose the Court relaxed its
unwillingness to construe the clause. What protections might it provide? The answer is, in all likelihood, not much.
According to Madison, a government is a "republic" when it
"derives all its power directly or indirectly from the great body of the
people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior."" 8 Further,
[i]t is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great
body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored
class of it .... It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people
319

While this definition sounds promising, it delivers less than it seems.
After giving this definition of republican government, Madison goes on
to show how the proposed national government is acceptably republican even though only one house of one branch of the proposed government, the House of Representatives, is popularly elected. The Senate, President and judiciary do not make the United States inadequately
republican because they are selected indirectly by the people-through
the state legislatures, the electoral college, and the joint presidential
and senatorial confirmation process. 320 Indeed, Madison's definition
would not be offended even if no government officials at all were
elected directly by the people.
317I wish to stress that the following account is not one with which
I agree. Although
I find the Court's conclusions to flow plausibly from its assumptions, I believe those conclusions to rest on a methodology of constitutional interpretation that is excessively formal in its originalism. SeeJames A. Gardner, The PositivistFoundationsof OQrginalism-An
Account and Critique,71 B.U. L REV. 1 (1991). A full account of my reasons for disagreeing with the Court are beyond the scope of this Article.
1 THEFEDERALIST NO. 39 (James
Madison).

319 Id.

o See i4.
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Obviously, this is a conception of republican government far narrower than the contemporary view, which has gravitated toward preferences for direct popular election of as many significant officials as possible. On the federal level, the Seventeenth Amendment has instituted
direct popular election of Senators, s2 and the electoral college has collapsed into a close approximation of direct popular election.32 2 On the
state level, not only are many judges elected, s23 but so are many executive branch officials like comptrollers and attorneys general. 2 4
The Guarantee Clause, then, seems to require very little in the way
of opportunities for the direct exercise of protective democracy. Although states are apparently free to provide more opportunities for selfprotection through democratic institutions than the clause requires,
they need not provide much if they so choose. But what of the distribution of the franchise? Suppose a state chooses, as all have done, to provide more protective democracy than the Guarantee Clause requires.
Does the clause at least require the state to distribute the franchise as
widely as possible? Again, the answer seems to be negative.
Although Madison's language-he speaks, for example, of the
"great body of society"-suggests that the franchise must be widely
available in a government that counts as republican, this impression is
misleading. In an effort to calm anxieties, Madison took the position in
The FederalistNo. 43 that the existing forms of state governments would
necessarily meet the test of the Guarantee Clause. A century later, the
Court echoed Madison's reasoning in Minor v. Happersett,3 ' an 1874
challenge to a state law prohibiting women from voting. The Court
ruled that although the plaintiff was a citizen, the Constitution did not
require that all citizens be made voters. The heart of the Court's ruling
was its conclusion that no provision of the Constitution could have
been intended to require states to grant the franchise more broadly
than did any of the original states at the time of ratification.32 6 AS
women were uniformly disenfranchised by 7the original states, they
could not claim a constitutional right to vote.
121 U.S.

CONST. amend. XVII.

s22

See infraPart HI.C.2.

"

See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 31 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1996, at

133-35 tbl.4.4.
32' See id at 35-36 tbl.2.10.
' 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
'" See id at 171-77.
'27The
same presumably would have been true of blacks until ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, and remains true of poor white males so long as the relevant
property test is not imposed in the form ofa tax. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
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Although not based on the Guarantee Clause, many contemporary
Court decisions nonetheless reflect a similar understanding of the Constitution as setting an extremely minimal threshold of political rights.
The Court has held, for example, that nothing in the Constitution requires a state's chief executive to be popularly elected . It has also declined to construe the Constitution to require states to structure local
governments in any particular way, and has suggested that there is no
constitutional right to be governed by elected rather than appointed
local government officials.330
b. The Allocation of Voting Rights to the States

If the Guarantee Clause proves unaccommodating to protective
democracy-based claims, might a constitutional right to vote exist elsewhere in the document? The Court has, after all, often spoken of such
a right. 3 ' Again, the answer, in the Court's view, seems to be that there
is no such right.
The seeds of this conclusion are found in some of the Court's unfortunately rather offhand attempts to reconcile its most contradictory
statements about the right to vote. As noted earlier, the Court has at
times made apparently diametrically opposed statements about the
right to vote: it has said both that the Constitution protects the right to
vote in state and federal elections, and that there is no substantive constitutional right to vote for any state or federal office. 332 The Court has
occasionally tried to reconcile these statements in the following way. It
is correct, the Court has indicated, to say that the Constitution confers
on no individual a substantive right to vote. The Equal Protection
Clause, however, requires that individuals be permitted to participate in
su SeeFortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
The leading case is still Hunterv. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907)
(holding that states have absolute discretion over the structure and nature of their municipal corporations).
' SeeSailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1967) (holding that no election
was required for the county's school board members); see also Rosenthal v. Board of
Educ., 385 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (3-judge court) (per curiam), aff'd 420 U.S. 985
(1975) (holding that the area's school board need not be popularly elected); Pirincin v.
Board of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (3-judge court) (same); Egan v.
Wisconsin State Bd., 332 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (3-judge court) (same); Wallis v.
Blue, 263 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (3-judge court) (holding that state constitutional
procedures for a grandjury selection of school board members did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
" See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (noting that the "right to vote
freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society").
332 See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.

1997]

A RECONSIDERATION OFTHE RIGHT TO VOTE

elections "on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the
State has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's population.
In other words, the Constitution does not require states to grant the right to vote to anyone;
consequently, there is no constitutional right to vote. The Constitution
thus requires the creation of no institutions of protective democracy at
all. Should a state choose to go beyond this minimum requirement,
however, it must do so consistent with principles of equal protection.
Although the Court has never elaborated on this reading of the
Constitution," the reading finds some support in the constitutional
text. Article I, Section 2 provides: "The House of Representatives shall
be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of
the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature."335 The Seventeenth Amendment applies the same language to the election of senators.3s r These two provisions operate to extend the franchise in federal elections to those citizens in each state
who are qualified under state law to vote for members of the state Assembly.33 7 Thus, the Constitution seems to place explicitly and exclusively in the hands of the states decisions about the distribution of the
right to vote in congressional elections. Moreover, Article II provides
for presidential election by electors, who are to be appointed in each
state "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct. " 3- This
gives states even greater control over voter qualifications in presidential
elections in that the state need not provide at all for popular election of

-"s

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973); accord

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) ("[A] citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.").
"mThe closest the Court has come to directly expounding this kind of theory is
probably its discussion in Minorv.Happerset488 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 170-71 (1874), ofwhy
the right to vote is not a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship within the
meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
ss5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
s See id. at amend. XVII, § 1 ("The electors in each State shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.").
3 7 Every state except Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature, has a bicameral
legislature composed of an Assembly or House of Representatives, and a smaller Senate.
SeeTHE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 323, at 63 tbl.3.1.
sss U.S. CONST. art. If,
§ 1. The states have broad latitude in deciding upon methods
to select electors. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) ("[T]he appointment
and mode of appointment of electors belong exclusively to the States.").
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• •339
presidential
electors.
Taken together, these provisions suggest that the United States
Constitution commits wholly to the states decisions about who may vote
in federal elections, and that the document therefore provides United
States citizens with no substantive right to vote whatsoever. 340 The implications of this reading of the Constitution are significant, for it follows that a state so inclined could constitutionally disable its citizens
from voting for any federal office by eliminating popular election of
presidential electors, and by reducing to zero the number of its citizens
eligible to vote for members of the state Assembly.'
Of course, the
price would be steep: the
S 342state would forfeit its representation in the
House of Representatives, and such measures would almost certainly
be unpopular. On this reading of the Constitution, however, it would
be legal.34 3 Moreover, even if eliminating popular elections for the state
assembly would violate what minimal protections the Guarantee Clause
might provide, the Court's application of the political question doctrine

'" During the early history of the United States, in many states presidential electors
were selected by the state legislatures rather than by popular vote. SeeMcPherson, 146 U.S.
at 29 (noting that in the first presidential election, this method was followed in Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, NewJersey and South Carolina).
340 This conclusion is entirely consistent with the substantial
body of case law holding
that Congress has extensive powers to regulate federal elections. See, e.g., United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934); United
States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); In reCoy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); ExParteSiebold,100
U.S. 371 (1879). Just because Congress has the power to provide a larger dose of protective democracy than the Constitution minimally requires does not raise an inference that
the Constitution sets these minima at any particular point. Indeed, any inference might
run more strongly in the other direction. SeeLowenstein, supranote 191, at 73.
41 This

was essentially Justice Harlan's position. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
593-614 (1964) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
342 The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twentyone years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged.., the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2 (1868). For a discussion of the history and significance of
this section, see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-53 (1974) and Reynol 377 U.S. at

593-608 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
34' But see Michael J. Perry, Modern EqualProtection:A Conceptualizationand Appraisal
79 COLUM. L REv. 1023, 1079 (1979) (arguing that it is "wholly unnecessary for the Court
to declare that there is a constitutional right to vote in state elections because the existence of the franchise as a political-moral right is unquestioned," and no state "would
even dream of abolishing the franchise").
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would precludejudicial enforcement of the guarantee.
c. Voting as a TertiaryForm ofProtection

These conclusions about the lack of a constitutional right to vote
seem strange to the modem legal mind. How is it possible for the
Framers to have embraced notions of protective democracy yet to have
created a plan of government that affords the people so little actual opportunity to protect themselves democratically? In fact, this situation
posed no contradiction for the Framers. Despite the modem Court's
rhetoric about the importance of the right to vote, for the Framers, voting in the United States actually played a comparatively minor role in
the protection of fundamental rights from government encroachment.
Consequently, judicial recognition of a substantive constitutional right
to vote might well have seemed to them unnecessary.
For reasons discussed earlier,3 4 there can be little doubt that a primary purpose of the founding generation was to create a constitutional
scheme of governance that would secure the fundamental rights of the
American people against invasion by the newly created national govemnment. Indeed, this was of such great concern to the Framers that
they created three mutually supporting mechanisms designed to
achieve this end: separation of powers, a bill of rights, and direct election of Representatives.
The separation of powers-including the vertical separation effected by federalism-protects liberty by dividing governmental power,
and then providing officials within each power center with "the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments
of the others."m This struggle disables government officials from
" The Bill of
amassing the kind of power necessary to create a tyranny.W
Rights protects the fundamental liberties of the people even more directly, by explicitly identifying the protected rights and prohibiting
their abridgment by the government. When enforced by an independent judiciary, this kind of restraint becomes quite potent. Finally, voting protects fundamental rights by allowing the people to make sure
that elective government offices are occupied by individuals who are
unlikely to turn on the people and invade their rights.
See supra PartIA
THEFEDERAUST No. 51 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, mayjustly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.").
'5
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The Constitution thus creates a form of government that is protective-but it is less clear that the form of government so created is a protective democracy in the sense in which the term is usually meant. The
theory of protective democracy that we inherited from English political
thought 7 was devised to justify popular control over a government in
which the legislature was supreme, and in which the legislative and executive branches were not clearly distinct. 48 In a government lacking a
written bill of rights or a sharp separation of powers, the right to vote is
critically important because it is virtually the only effective way to restrain government power.
In the United States, on the other hand, voting may be far less important than theories of protective democracy suggest. First, the fundamental rights that voters might otherwise seek to protect at the polls
already receive direct, substantive protection under the Bill of Rights
and other constitutional provisions, reducing the urgency of electoral
supervision. 9 Second, the systems of horizontal and vertical separation
of powers-checks and balances and federalism-substantially reduce
the threat to those rights posed by the government in the first place.
Under such a scheme of governance, voting is at the very least reduced
to only one of several methods for protecting liberty, and it may well be
the least important one. The Framers unequivocally believed that democracy is not a form of government in which the rights of the citizens
are likely to be respected.350 For these reasons, the lack of a constitutionally mandatory right to vote seems, if not less troubling, then at
least less puzzling.
d. Where Does theRight to Vote Come From?
Taking the position that the Constitution contains no substantive
right to vote in federal elections has obviously made the Court extremely uncomfortable, and it has strained in many cases to limit the
destructive potential inherent in such a narrow construction of the
341

See supra Part IA; see also Gardner, supra note 62, at 200-13 (arguing that the Con-

stitution is based on "aLockean theory of popular sovereignty").
"'g For example, the British Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers are all sitting
members of Parliament.
'9 See Alexander, supra note 177, at 574 ("Our version of democracy combines substantive and procedural conceptions. The substantive conception is reflected in the various constitutional rights that trump pure majoritarianism and in the institution ofjudicial review that enforces those rights and rules. It is not reflected in a concern for the
demography of electoral districts.").
-'' The most notable expression of this view is THE ]FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madi-
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right. For example, the Court has held that Congress has the power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override state decisions and confer eligibility to vote in federal elections when necessary to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause.!5 ' More importantly, the Court
has created a bizarre equal protection doctrine under which the right
to vote, a right that in the Court's view lacks any substantive constitutional protection, is nevertheless considered fundamental for equal
protection purposes, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny of laws
distributing the franchise.3 52 The idea of according full-blown fundamental-right treatment under the Equal Protection Clause to a right
concededly offered no substantive constitutional protection has been
roundly criticized, even by friends of the Court's results.' 3
What has led the Court to this point? How can a powerful right to
vote materialize from nowhere? Explanations will be easier to come by
if we first consider the features of communitarian democracy that have
made it attractive to the Court in many voting rights cases.
C. The Attractionsof CommunitarianDemocracy Claims

1. The Logic of Communitarian Democracy-Based
Voting Rights Claims
Communitarian democracy is about exclusion: according to this
theory, people want the vote because its possession signals the possessor's status as a full member of society. Voting rights claims based on
communitarian democracy are thus framed independently of any questions concerning governmental structure and political influence. Instead, the claimant says, in effect: "Voting is a pivotal social practice
that defines full membership in this society. As a full member of this
society, I must be afforded the opportunity to vote."
This formulation embraces three separate subclaims. First, the
claimant asserts that voting su is an essential emblem of full membership
in society. Second, the claimant asserts that he or she is, or is entitled
'
3

See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.

No. 15,395 U.S. 621 (1969).
35
See, e.g., Perry, supra note 343, at 1078; Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the
FourteenthAmendmen 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979). The Court has since moved toward
recognizing rights as fundamental only when they can be found in the constitutional

text. SeeSan Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,33-36 (1973).
s Or any other identified practice; such claims need not be limited to voting. See
infraPart IV.B.
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to be treated as, a full member of society and therefore entitled to join
in the society's socially central activities. Finally, the claimant asserts
that his or her exclusion from participation in the identified activity is
wrongful.
Against what standards are such claims to be evaluated? Clearly,
communitarian claims are based on something more than the law itself.
They are not merely legal claims, but social claims, and they consequently appeal broadly to societal self-understanding. The communitarian-based claim is a claim about the kind of society we have: here are
the things we do that are significant, and here are the kinds of people
we include in these activities. Legal and constitutional standards are by
no means irrelevant; they are important constitutive elements of any
society's self-understanding.*5 Yet they hardly exhaust such understandings, which may draw on a host of extralegal social or political customs and conventions.
One significant source of these customs and conventions, which
overlaps to a great extent with any community's self-understanding, is
its traditions. Consequently, the resolution of communitarian democracy-based voting rights claims should take into account American
democratic traditions, broadly defined. Moreover, in light of the specific assumptions implicit in communitarian democracy claims, relevant
traditions would certainly include traditional American understandings
of the rights and privileges of citizenship as well as traditional understandings of eligibility for citizenship status.
2. The Appeal ofAmerican Democratic Traditions
Because we tend to think of tradition as conservative, we generally
assume that its application to constitutional questions will yield politically and legally conservative results. This kind of constitutional adjudication is sometimes criticized as unduly protective of an unfair status
quo.5 " It comes as a pleasant surprise, then, that traditional American
understandings of democracy are far more progressive than the standards written into the Constitution. As we have seen, the Constitution
is understood to contain no substantive right to vote and to implement
35 See, e.g., KARST, supranote 61; SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTrfUTIONALFAITH (1988);
JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' BOw (1985); Robert A. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the
Teaching of the Parable, 93 YALE I.J. 455 (1984); James A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourseof
State Constitutionalism,90 MiCH. L. REv. 761, 768-70, 815-16 (1991); Paul W. Kahn, Community in ContemporayConstitutionalTeoy, 99YALE L.J. 1 (1989).

See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supranote 45 (arguing that the use of common law traditions as
a constitutional baseline preserves an unjust status quo).
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no significant mandatory regime of protective democracy. In sharp
contrast, American tradition has from the nation's birth been far more
inclusive, protective and generally democratic than the Constitution itself.
One of the earliest manifestations of a tension between the constitutional scheme and popular American beliefs about democracy was
the almost immediate collapse of the electoral college. 7 Intended to
be a body of wise and virtuous citizens exercising independent judgment,358 it quickly devolved into a reliable conduit for the implementation, as nearly as possible within constitutional constraints, of a form of
direct presidential election. 9 A similar fate ultimately befell the constitutional method for selecting senators. Originally, senators were to be
selected by state legislatures exercising the same kind of independent
judgment expected of the electoral college. Yet the public soon began to influence senatorial selections through the use of party nominating conventions and direct senatorial primaries, 361 and popular dissatisfaction with the performance of state legislatures eventually led to the
institution of direct senatorial election upon ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.s 2
Another tension between traditional and constitutional standards
of democracy has been the constant pressure exerted by the former on
the latter for expansion of the franchise. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments expanded the franchise
to preclude exclusions based on race, sex, payment of taxes and age,
respectively.3 These amendments reflect social understandings of a
connection between voting and citizenship far stronger than that formally implemented by the Constitution.36'
Many of these tensions have been reflected in parallel developSeeU.S. CONST. art. II,

§ I and amend. XII.

See, e.g., THE FEDERAusT No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).

In Justice Jackson's scathing words: "This arrangement miscarried. Electors, although often personally eminent, independent, and respectable, officially become voluntary party lackeys and intellectual nonentities .... As an institution the Electoral College
suffered atrophy almost indistinguishable from rigor mortis." Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,
232 (1952) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
' See Terry Smith, Rediscoveringthe Sovereignty of the People: The CaseforSenateDistricts,
75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1996).
5" For an account of the factors underlying passage of the Seventeenth Amendment,
see HOEBEKE, supranote 110, at 189-95.
SeeU.S. CONSr. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874) (ruling that voting is
nota privilege or immunity of citizenship within the meaning of the Constitution).
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ments in the evolution of political parties. Almost entirely unforeseen
by the Framers, the growth of political parties has had a significant impact on the democratization ofAmerican politics; indeed, in his classic
study of the party system, the political scientist E.E. Schattschneider declared flatly that "political parties created democracy and ...modem
democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties."36 Political parties have not only made formal politics more democratic,6 but have
become internally more democratic over time.
Finally, American democratic traditions today include well over a
century of congressional enactments implementing standards of fair
elections and good government that greatly surpass any constitutionally
established minima. These include laws prohibiting violence and intimidation at elections,m minimizing duress in the voting process by
prohibiting certain uses of political patronage, 60 prohibiting the disenfranchisement of racial and language minorities 370 and regulating the
giving and accepting of money in federal election campaigns.37'
Theories of communitarian democracy are well-placed to take advantage of these comparatively progressive understandings ofAmerican
citizenship and its relation to voting. Unlike protective democracy,
which relies heavily on the constitutional creation of officially sanctioned means of political influence, communitarian democracy relies
on societal understandings and traditions that need not be firmly
bound to the constitutional text.
3. Tradition as an Object of Interpretation
Another feature of communitarian democracy's reliance on tradition that might make it attractive to courts is the broadly interpretive
s6 E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1 (1942).

Schattschneider makes the bold claim that political parties act extralegally in powerful ways. They "control the decisions ofpublic authorities at the points at which the law
cannot control them." Id.at 11-12. This allows parties "to compel public officers to behave in ways that the law does not contemplate, by methods ofwhich the law is ignorant,
without in any way affecting the validity of their official acts." Id.
at 12.
"67 See V.0. KEYJR., PoLmrcs, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 396-98 (5th ed. 1964)
(tracing the development ofnational primary system).
36 Among the earliest enactments were the Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140
(1870); the Force Act, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871); and the Ku Klux Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13
(1871).
m See Hatch Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070 (1925).
-'0 SeeVoting Rights Act, Pub. L No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
"' See Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971), amended
by Pub. L. No. 93.442, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
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manner in which the relevant traditions are assessed. Protective democracy claims are claims about the actual ability of individuals and
groups to use the political process to protect themselves and their interests. Resolution of this kind of claim can consequently be extremely
complex and factually messy; a court may need to consider the relevant
powers of the government body, the responsiveness of elected officials,
the kinds of stimuli that evoke political responses, the reactions of potential coalition partners, and a host of other complex factorssomething, that is, like the372"intensely local appraisal" that the Court
spoke of in White v. Regester, or the kind of fact-bound analysis now required by section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.3 73

Communitarian democracy-based claims, in contrast, are measured
against community understandings and socially constitutive traditions.
Although the content of community understandings and traditions
could easily be the subject of formal evidentiary fact-finding, the Court
typically has reached conclusions in this area by a far more rough-andready process, one that tends more to the openly interpretive than the
aspirationally objective.3 74 Because eyeballed interpretations of tradition are easier and cleaner than the kind of functional evaluations of
government power and citizen influence that protective democracy
analysis would require, courts may prefer communitarian democracy as
a path ofleast resistance.,
A hint of these factors may be found in the line of decisions starting
with Shaw v. Reno.s75 In Shaw and its progeny, the Court struck down
several state redistricting plans on the ground that the legislatures were
guided in their line-drawing predominantly by racial considerations,
3 76
and that the plans were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.
Because the plaintiffs in these cases complained not of diminished
or inadequate political influence, but of a racial affront, the majority
opinions quite properly treated the plaintiffs' claims as communitarian.
This characterization, however, allowed the Court to deal with the is412 U.S. 755,769 (1973).
37 SeeThornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). As Samuel Issacharoff has pointed
out, aspects of the Voting Rights Act "forced the judiciary to confront the actual operation of challenged electoral systems." Issacharoff, supra note 227, at 1836.
S74The Court tends to treat the content oftraditions and community understandings
as "constitutional facts," to be found by general knowledge, rather than "facts" to be
found through evidence. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 508 n.27
(1984); Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFactReview, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229 (1985).
s 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shawl).
76 See id.; Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995); Shaw
v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct.
1894 (1996) (Shawl);Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
37
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sues at a level that was comfortably conceptual. Thus, the majority
opinions dealt with broad definitions of the nature of cognizable harms
arising from gerrymandering, s " or the kinds of reasons that a state
might legitimately offer tojustify race-based districting.3 78
Justice Stevens's dissent in Shaw II,37 for example, presents an instructive contrast. Writing for himself and two other dissenters, Justice
Stevens treated the underlying issue as one of protective democracy.
The Voting Rights Act, he argued, was designed to improve the political
effectiveness of racial minorities ss° a notion consistent with theories of
protective democracy. Stevens expressed considerable skepticism about
the possible communitarian basis of the plaintiffs' claim, condemning
"speculative judicial suppositions about the societal message that is to
be gleaned from race-based districting. "ss'
This focus committed Justice Stevens to a much more fact-intensive
analysis. He demanded that the plaintiffs show that "their political representatives are actually unlikely to provide effective representation,
and that the legislature was in fact motivated by racial considerationssss
He went on to devote several pages of a lengthy opinion to an analysis
of the motivations of the legislature,ss 4 something the majority was able
simply to infer as a result of its conceptual communitarian approach.
D. The Court'sMove to EqualProtection

We have now identified several reasons why the Court might prefer
communitarian democracy-based voting rights claims to protective democracy-based claims. How has this preference been implemented?
The answer lies in the Court's turn to the Equal Protection Clause as
the main vehicle for resolving denial-of-influence claims.
In his seminal article on the Fourteenth Amendment, Ira C. Lupu
argues convincingly that the Warren Court turned to equal protection
as a source of substantive rights because it could not feasibly rely on the
doctrine of substantive due process, which had become discredited following the Lochnerera.sss Lupu terms the consequences of this sleights, See ShawI, 509 U.S. at 630; Mille, 115 S. Ct. at 2475.

3'a ShawfI, 116 S. Ct. at 1894; Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1941.
s9 Shawl!, 116 S. Ct. at 1907 (StevensJ, dissenting).
38 See id.at 1908.
S, Id.at 1910.
IMat 1911 (emphasis added).
See i. at 1912-13.
s84 See id. at 1914-16.
See Lupu, supranote 353, at 993-96.
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of-hand "lamentable" for voting rights jurisprudence because it caused
the Court to take a set of rights that could plausibly be inferred from
the constitutional structure and situate them in a constitutional provision that provided no clear limiting principles.- Lupu's diagnosis rests
at least partly on his belief that a substantial right to vote can be found
in the Constitution, 7 an entirely plausible conclusion that, as we have
seen, was rejected squarely by the Court. The Court's turn to equal
protection, however, has had another dramatic consequence: it has
made the Court far more receptive to theories of communitarian democracy than it might otherwise have been.
Consider a typical denial-of-influence claim brought by plaintiffs relying on a theory of protective democracy. Substantive resolution of
such a claim would require the Court to decide the level of political influence to which the plaintiffs are constitutionally entitled, something
the Court evidently wishes to avoid. By moving to an equal protection
analysis, the Court has required such plaintiffs to recast their claims.
Instead of arguing that they have been denied a degree of substantive
political influence guaranteed by the Constitution, plaintiffs must now
find an object of comparison and argue that they have been granted
less political influence than the comparison group or individual.
In several ways, the equal protection framework seems to require
plaintiffs to assert what is, essentially, a theory of communitarian democracy. The heart of a communitarian democracy claim is the contention that the government has given the plaintiff less than it has given
others, a claim with obvious similarities to a prima facie claim of unequal treatment under equal protection principles. Communitarian
democracy claims also appeal to a powerful strand in equal protection
doctrine that sees the Equal Protection Clause as intended primarily to
prevent demeaning social exclusions. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the two: equal protection analysis is parasitic

See id. at 1031-32.

Sl Seeid. at 1064-70.
3 Certainly the most offensive of these are slavery itself and itsJim Crow equivalent,
segregation. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). See generally
Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword.. Equal Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1977) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a core value of equal
citizenship). Nevertheless, the Equal Protection Clause contains another strand that corresponds more closely to theories of protective democracy. This view is probably best
expressed inJustice Jackson's observation that "there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles
of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally." Railway
Express Agency v. NewYork, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson,J., concurring).
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upon substantive theories, whereas communitarian democracy is itself a
substantive theory of right.
As numerous scholars have shown, the notion of equality cannot by
itself provide a standard for judging -the constitutionality of unequal
treatment. What constitutes equal treatment can be decided only incidentally to the application of some substantive conception of rights or
justice.389 This means that the logic of protective democracy claims
cannot be avoided by moving from substantive standards of political influence to a norm of equality found in the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court still must establish some kind of substantive baseline against
which to measure the propriety of any challenged allocation of political
influence. If such a baseline is not drawn from the Constitution, it
must be drawn from elsewhere. The move to equal protection analysis
invites plaintiffs to use as a baseline, not the degree of political influence the Constitution officially provides, but the degree of influence in
fact held by others.
Yet this move to an equal protection analysis should not get the
Court off the hook. To resolve a denial-of-influence claim cast in equal
protection garb, the Court must first decide whether the amount of influence possessed by those to whom the plaintiffs compare themselves
is a constitutionally relevant standard of comparison. Yet that question
can be decided only by going back to the Constitution to determine
what rights of political influence it grants. This, as many have noted,
makes the equal protection analysis largely superfluous.Y
The case law suggests that the Court has indeed been unable to
avoid setting a baseline, but that the equal protection context has allowed the Court surreptitiously to import a theory of communitarian
democracy as a substantivebaseline for resolution of equal protection
claims. The Court permits this to occur by, in essence, treating community understandings and traditions concerning the right to vote as
presumptively entitled to legal recognition. 3 ' The result is an adjudicaSee Westen, supra note 251, at 547; Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof
Process-BasedConstitutionalTheoies, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980); Lupu, supra note 353,

at 985; Perry, supra note 343, at 1027; Karst, supranote 388, at 5-11; see also Howard &
Howard, supra note 303, at 1635; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300-01 (1962) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
"0 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 343, at 1075-77; Westen, supra note 251, at 543.
"'A good example is the Court's present inclination to treat a state's use of
"traditional districting principles" as presumptively constitutional, even in the face of a
direct claim that the use of traditional districting principles is exactly what causes illegal
minority vote dilution. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2489 (1995)
(concluding that a state legislature's compliance with traditional districting principles
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tory baseline that floats with changing community understandings of
voting and democracy.
The Court has achieved this result in two distinct ways. First, the
Court has at times explicitly rejected original constitutional understandings as legitimate bases for making voting rights decisions, choosing instead to rely on more favorable protective democracy traditions. The
clearest example of this is Harperv. VirginiaBoardofElections, 2in which
the Court struck down a state poll tax that was a prerequisite for voting.
In a careful historical analysis of the role of property qualifications in
colonial America, Justice Harlan argued in dissent that the Constitution
could not be understood to condemn voting qualifications like the Virginia poll tax. 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas bluntly responded: "In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality....
Notions of what constitutes equal treatment... do change. " 39 4 Of
course, what Justice Douglas meant is not that notions of equality
change,395 but rather that substantive notions of democracy change.
The Court in Harper recognized this change by substituting for unsatisfying constitutional baselines of protective democracy an equal protection baseline consisting of a set of far more protective American democratic traditions. ' u As the Court has become more conservative in both
its politics and its methodology of constitutional interpretation, however, this direct strategy has become less attractive.
A second approach by which the Court has facilitated the emergence of a communitarian democracy standard is its turn to citizenship
as an equal protection baseline. For example, in Holt Civic Club v. City
of Tuscaloosa,97 a case considered earlier,398 residents of a suburb of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, complained of being subject to certain Tuscaloosa
regulations without being.able to vote for the Tuscaloosa officials who
made and enforced those regulations. The Court rejected the claim,
essentially on the ground that the citizens of Holt were just thatcitizens of Holt, and not of Tuscaloosa. The same approach yielded a

may suffice to refute a claim of racial gerrymandering).
3g' U.S. 663 (1966).
883
S9S See id.at 684-85 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
IM.at 669.

According to Westen, the idea of equality has endured for so long precisely because it has no substantive content. SeeWesten, supranote 251, at 547-48.
See Harper,383 U.S. at 670.
"9 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
See supraPart IAL.
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different result in Dunn v. Blumstein,5 9 a case in which the Court struck
down a durational residency requirement that barred Tennessee residents from voting until they had lived in the state for one year. Although Tennessee did not consider its residents to be citizens for purposes of voting during their first year of residency, the Court held, in
effect, that Tennessee lacked that option-its residents simply were citizens as far as the Equal Protection Clause was concerned, and could not
therefore be denied the vote.4°°
The thrust of these cases is to establish for purposes of equal protection analysis a baseline conception of citizenship embracing both
voting and residency. Yet it is clear from the Court's prior decisions
that this is a conception of citizenship that has been allowed to float
free from the moorings of constitutional standards. What happens
when the Court adheres strictly to constitutional standards of citizenship is illustrated vividly by Minorv. Happersett,40 an 1874 challenge to a
state law prohibiting women from voting. The Court ruled that although the plaintiff was a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution, the Constitution nevertheless did not require that all citizens be
made voters. The Court held that no provision of the Constitution
could have been intended to require states to grant the franchise more
broadly than did any of the original states at the time of ratification.0 2
Since the original states disenfranchised women, women could constitutionally be denied the right to vote.4°' This is a far stingier substantive
conception of the right to vote than the one relied on by the Court in
Holt and Dunn.
The move to citizenship as an equal protection baseline does not by
itself create a bias toward communitarian democracy-based voting
rights claims: citizenship can just as easily provide an appropriate substantive baseline for resolving protective democracy-based claims. But
by drawing its substantive conceptions of citizenship from contemporary community understandings and traditions rather than constitutionally established standards, the Court has smuggled into the equal
protection analysis an adjudicatory baseline that is particularly congenial to communitarian democracy-based claims.

405 U.S. 330 (1972).
"0 See id. at 351-52.
401 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
4 2 See id.at 171-76.
'CoThe same presumably would have been true of blacks until ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, and remains true ofpoor white males so long as the relevant
property test is not imposed in the form of a tax. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF RIGHT-TO-REPRESENTATION CLAIMS

I want to conclude by returning to the subject of right-torepresentation claims. As we saw earlier, these are complex claims that
seek to expand the boundaries of the right to vote by defining it to include not merely enfranchisement and equal weighting of ballots, but
an affirmative entitlement to representation. Right-to-representation
claims arise primarily in racial and political gerrymandering cases under the Constitution and racial gerrymandering cases under the Voting
Rights Act-the kinds of cases that have generated the greatest amount
ofpublic and academic controversy.
Right-to-representation claims typically rest on theories of protective democracy; their premise is that the only feasible way for citizens to
achieve a level of political influence adequate to protect their rights and
0 Yet the Court has
interests is to elect a representative of their choice.4 °4
rights
claims, includvoting
democracy-based
hostile
to
protective
been
ing right-to-representation claims. On the other hand, voting rights
claims seem to get a friendlier judicial reception when they rest on
communitarian theories of democracy. This raises the final question I
shall deal with in this Article: whether it is possible to recast right-torepresentation claims as communitarian-based claims, thereby giving
them a better chance for survival in future encounters with the Court.
This question can be broken down into two separate inquiries: first, is it even possible to base a right-to-representation claim on
communitarian grounds; and second, can such claims be cast so as to
appeal successfully to the Court's preferences? I conclude that right-torepresentation claims can be based on communitarian theories of democracy, but that in such a form they are likely to be too weak to appeal
much to the Court.
A. ElectoralFailureas a Form ofExclusion
Because communitarian theories of democracy stress exclusion,
they are most potent when the exclusion at which they take aim is most
extreme. Where voting is concerned, exclusion is obviously most severe
in cases of complete disenfranchisement, and in such cases communitarian-based claims have had their greatest successes. Nevertheless,
there is nothing intrinsic to communitarian-based theories of democracy that limits their applicability to cases of total exclusion from the
franchise.
4"

SeesupraPart II.C.
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Suppose, for example, that I have the franchise and that I may, in
the words of the Court, "register and vote without hindrance."0 5 Yet
suppose that in election after election, I find myself voting for the losing candidate. Year after year, my district sends representatives to the
Senate, to Congress, and to the state and county legislatures, yet the
candidates I prefer inevitably lose. By itself, this might not be cause for
concern. But suppose that when I look at my neighbors, I see something very different. My neighbors, it seems, often vote for a winnernot all the time, perhaps, but far more often than I. As a result, they
have something that I lack: representatives-representatives in Congress, in the statehouse, in the county and town governments. My
neighbors' views are heard and pressed at every level, and I cannot help
wondering that if they have theirrepresentatives, why don't I have mine?
Might I not legitimately think of myself as a second-class citizen? Full
membership in society, I might say, means more than merely casting
ballots; it means having someone in power looking out for one's interests. Consequently, I cannot think of myself as a member of this club if
I am never on the winning side in any election contest, if I can never
look at the legislative body claiming to represent me and see someone
for whom I voted.4 °6 There can be little doubt that many people experience repeated electoral defeat in precisely this way-as an alienating
47
repudiation not merely of their views, but of themselves as persons. 0
The key, then, to building a right-to-representation claim on a
communitarian foundation is to redefine the way in which society
measures full citizenship. One must claim that although- having the
vote is a necessary attribute of membership in American society, and
thus not to be disparaged, it is nevertheless not the measure offull citi-

405Mobile v. Bolden,

446 U.S. 55, 55 (1980).
This position is similar to what Rae has called "lot-regarding equality." Douglas
Rae, Two ContradictoryIdeas of(Political)Equality, 91 ETHICS 451, 452 (1981). The communitarian democracy version, however, seems more sophisticated in the sense that equality
is sought for a purpose-namely, achieving the status of full citizenship. Rae's account of
"lot-regarding equality" seems to view citizenship as a simple-minded desire for the things
of others without regard to their significance, or in consideration of all things as equally
significant. The possibility of anyone actually holding such a view seems slight.
'07
See, e.g., GUINIER, TYRANNY, supranote 29, at 76-77 (discussing how black students
considered majority decisionmaking at predominantly white schools to be illegitimate
because the process "shut them out"). Similarly, Davidson quotes Tom McCain, "one of
the first blacks elected to office since Reconstruction in Edgefield County, South Carolina" as saying "[a] race of people who are excluded from public office will always be second class." QUIET RvOLUTION, supra note 46, at 16 (quoting Laughlin McDonald, The

VotingRights Act Is the Only HopeAgainst a Century ofAll-White Rule; 1981 CIVIL LIBERTIES 34.
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zenship. Full citizenship, the argument goes, requires more than the
vote-it requires representation as well, and to be denied representation is to be excluded from the essence of American society.
B. The Slippery Slope Problem
This kind of expansion of the communitarian claim is both easy
and risky. It is easy because communitarian theories of democracy are
theories of community rather than democracy, of status rather than right.
Such claims focus on the conditions necessary to achieve a sense of belonging without supplying any tools to make normative judgments
about the society to which people seek to belong. No societal characteristic is ruled out so long as individuals are treated in a way that makes
them feel like full members of society.
For this reason, the broadening move is also risky, .because it puts
us on a potentially steep slippery slope from which there is no obvious
exit. Suppose I am granted on communitarian grounds, through redistricting or the elimination of at-large voting, some right to elect my
"own" representative. Yet I cannot help noticing that other people's
representatives somehow seem to get their legislative agendas enacted
into law, whereas my representative's proposals are continually outvoted on the legislative floor. Can I possibly feel like a full member of
this society under those circumstances? Furthermore, bills passed by
the legislature must be signed into law by the President, Governor or
County Executive. Everyone else seems to be on the winning side once
in a while in the balloting for head of the executive branch, so I can
hardly feel like a full member of society when my own candidates keep
losing--I need more than my own legislative representative, I need my
own executive, too. At some point these kinds of claims clearly go too
far-but where is that point.' As with any slippery slope problem, the
difficulty comes in knowing where to draw the line.
Another problem with travelling down the slippery slope is that the
further down we go, the more the communitarian claim begins to resemble a protective democracy claim, the very thing we wish by hypothesis to avoid. The risk lies in defining citizenship in protective
democracy terms by claiming that the measure of a citizen is his or her
ability to exercise some particular degree of influence over the political
process. At this point, the communitarian claim collapses into the protective claim, effectively thwarting it.4°.
4' Protective democracy claims can also travel down a slippery slope. I might argue
that I cannot protect my rights without the vote; or without a representative for whom I
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C. Line-Drawingas InterpretingFullCitizenship

The key to exiting the slippery slope lies in recognizing that a
communitarian claim of the type we have been discussing is a claim
about the meaning of full membership in society. The validity of a
communitarian claim thus depends upon the validity of the underlying
interpretation of societal membership. Although it is possible to interpret societal membership in many ways and to base a claim of exclusion
on such interpretations, not every interpretation is equally good. When
an interpretation goes wrong, one may reject the claim in the only way
possible: by denying its accuracy. "No, you are mistaken," one might
say; "that is not what it means to be a full member of this society. Full
members of this society are entitled to vote, but not to win," or "they are
entitled to electoral success, but not legislative success," and so on.
To the extent that the Court's decisions respond to communitarian
claims, its line-drawing inevitably rests on some interpretation of what it
means to be a full member of American society. In its decisions, the
Court has chosen to draw a relatively clear and well-defended line at the
point of enfranchisement, subject to the one-person, one-vote rule. 40"
Thus, in the Court's view, full membership in American society entitles
one to cast a ballot, and to have that ballot fully weighted in the ensuing
count-nothing more.
This view of the matter should help clarify just how heavy a burden
is carried by one who wishes to convince the Court, on communitarian
democracy grounds, to recognize a right to representation. For although the Court's interpretation is not the only possible interpretation
of the attributes of full American citizenship-and, to be sure, other interpretations have been advanced 410-it is nevertheless a highly plausivoted; or without the power to veto legislation which I dislike, etc. See THERNSTROM, supra note 227, at 4 (interpreting the Voting Rights Act to give blacks a right to protection
from "action intended to minimize black power, once established, could not be easily
contained"); Hartman, supranote 167, at 694 (stating that the Court's decision in Whitcomb is partially explained by fears ofa slippery slope leading to dilution claims by "every
identifiable losing side"); Issacharoff, supra note 37, at 900 (stating that what is missing
from the Court's jurisprudence is "some mediating principle that keeps self-conscious
group identity from translating into a claim ofentitlement; without such a principle, the
logic of Gingles "pushes the redistricting process toward a racial and ethnic spoils system").
See supraPart II.
410 See, e.g.,Jamin B. Raskin, LegalAliens,LocalCitizens: The Histofica4 Constitutionaland
TheoreticalMeaningsof Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L REV. 1391, 1417-41 (1993) (concluding

that noncitizen suffrage does not offend constitutional principles); Gerald M. Rosberg,
Aliens andEqual Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MicH. I- REV. 1092, 1135-36

(1977) (concluding that a denial of voting rights to resident aliens can only bejustified
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ble interpretation that is unlikely to be easily dislodged.
Few Americans, I take it, would claim that one is less than fully a
citizen of this nation unless one has one's "own" representative in the
legislature. One of the main difficulties with taking such a position is
that almost everyone has from time to time been in the position of having voted for a loser.' To conceive of those who have backed a loser as
second-class citizens pending a new election with a different outcome
requires conceiving of citizenship as something that is constantly
gained and lost, or perhaps passed around from one majority coalition
to the next. While such a view of citizenship is imaginable, it does not
seem to be our own. Because Americans prize citizenship so highly,
they tend to view it as presumptively permanent and substantial, 412 not
something so flimsy and transient that it can come and go repeatedly in
a resident's lifetime. For Americans, citizenship simply is not linked to
success in the political arena.
To say this is not to deny that things may look different from the
"outside." Those Americans who seem never to have their own representative may feel so alienated from society as to consider themselves
second-class citizens. Their feelings are real, and their interpretation of
citizenship sensible from their point of view.4 13 Indeed, it is inevitable

in a society containing any kind of internal diversity that different
groups will place different interpretations on such socially significant
concepts as citizenship and democracy.1
by "some compelling state interest").
41 This issue shows up in the difficult problems of nonrepresentation of white subgroups. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977); THERNSROM, supranote 227, at 226; Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supranote 37,
at 601 (discussing use of whites as "filler people" to fill out designated majority-minority
districts). If the scope of representation is understood to include state and local legislative bodies or nonlegislative officials at any level, it would be shocking to find someone
who has been on the winning side in every contest.
412 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that persons born or naturalized in the
United States are citizens. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court has recognized this
principle to prohibit involuntary divestiture ofcitizenship. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44, 61 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958). Moreover, the Court held in Perez
that voting in a foreign election could be a legitimate ground for divesting an American
citizen of citizenship. SeePerer, 356 U.S. at 60. Clearly, the view behind such legislation is
that voting in a foreign election is an act of societal affiliation equivalent to a renunciation ofAmerican citizenship. It is the voting, then, and not the winning, that disaffiliates
the citizen.
'13For a sensitive and provocative view of the need to take such feelings seriously, see
generally Calhoun, supranote 233.
411See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC ARISTOTEUAN Soc'Y 167,

183-87 (1955-1956).

See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Ter-

Foreword:"Nomos andNarrative97 HARV. L REV. 4 (1983).
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Yet the existence, and even the inevitability, of differing interpretadons is not the same as equality among interpretations. One way to accommodate different opinions is to avoid choosing among them.1 6
Another way is to insist upon dialogue as a way to allow persuasion or
facilitate mutual understanding. 4 r But when decisions about the exercise of social power must be made-as when the Supreme Court must
construe the Constitution to decide a case-so too must a choice be
made among competing interpretations. And the only way to choose is
to sift through the various interpretations with. a willingness to pronounce some either mistaken orjust too idiosyncratic to credit
Particularly in the area ofvoting rights, but also in the field of racial
discrimination generally, the Court has been quite willing to do exactly
that-even if the cost is social controversy.1 7 For these reasons, it seems
unlikely that the Court will recognize a right-to-representation claim
any time soon, even if it is based on a theory of communitarian democracy.
CONCLUSION

Themes of liberty and community dominate the federal jurisprudence of voting rights in two competing theories of democracy, protective and communitarian. Voting rights litigants have created a rich, but
confusing, stew of ideas by invoking these concepts in a wide variety of
adjudicatory contexts. The courts have contributed to the confusion by
often failing to distinguish between the two theories, or by speaking the
language of one concept while acting according to the other. The most
striking manifestation of this confusion is a pattern in which the Supreme Court speaks primarily a language of protective democracy, yet
has proved itself largely hostile to voting rights claims premised on the
very theory that has provided the Court with so much of its stock of language and concepts. Conversely, the Court has proven to be far more
receptive to voting rights claims based on communitarian democracy
notions of exclusion and citizenship.
The root cause of this divergence lies in the conceptual structure of
"3 SeeJames A. Gardner, The Ambiguity ofLegalDreams: A CommunitafianDefense ofJudicialRestraint,71 N.C. L. REV. 805 (1993).
416 This is the position of deliberative democracy. See Gardner, supranote
45, at 42830,437-42.
417 Among the Court's more controversial recent decisions dealing with race are Croson, Adarand, Shaw and Miller. See City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816 (1993); Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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protective democracy- to resolve a claim of inadequate protection of
liberty, the Court must decide just how much protection the Constitution provides. The Court has been largely unwilling to do this not only
because of doubts about its competency, but also quite possibly because
it does not wish to embark upon a path that might force it to conclude
that the constitutionally mandatory level of citizen influence on the political process is extremely low.
The Court has avoided this course by refusing to extract a substantive right to vote from the constitutional text and structure. Instead,
the Court has turned to the Equal Protection Clause for a model of
relative protection of voting rights. By relying extensively on a mediating conception of citizenship drawn from community understandings
and American democratic traditions, the Court has become far more
receptive to voting rights claims based on theories of communitarian
democracy. At the same time, its reliance on community understandings and traditions has allowed it to craft a voting rights jurisprudence
that may well be significantly more progressive than the jurisprudence
to which it might commit itself if it relied solely upon constitutional text
and structure and the intentions of the Framers. The turn to equal
protection and communitarian democracy, in other words, may be responsible for giving us Harper,Kramerand Reynolds in lieu of Minor v.
Happrsett.
Ultimately, it is the Court's apparent commitment to a particular
mode of constitutional interpretation that puts it in this position. The
Constitution creates a republican form of government, 4 ' based on the
belief that a republican government is the form most conducive to the
protection of liberty and the stability of society.419 By its own terms, it
guarantees a republican form of government to the states,420 and it refers in numerous places to the "right of citizens of the United States to
vote."42' From such a document, it ought to be no trouble to infer the
existence not only of a constitutional right to vote, but of a right to vote
of considerable power.
Certainly there was a time when the Court was willing to make precisely these kinds of inferences. The most striking example is probably
Burroughsv. United States,4 in which the Court upheld a federal statute
418

SeeTHE FEDERALIST No.39 (James Madison).

419 SeeTHEFEDERAisT

NO. 10 (James Madison).

420See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every state in

this Union a Republican Form of Government....").
421 Id. at amends. XV, XIX, XX1V, XXVI.
4

290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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limiting campaign contributions by political committees to presidential
candidates.ss The defendants, charged with violating the statute, contended that Congress lacked the power to regulate this aspect of presidential elections. They relied on Article II, Section 1, Clause 4, which
seems rather plainly to limit congressional power over presidential elections to setting the date and time for choosing presidential electors.u
They then compared this language to the far broader language authorizing congressional regulation of elections to Congress,426 and argued
that the comparison revealed a strict limitation on congressional power
over presidential elections. This is about as plausible as a text-based argument can get, yet the Court squarely rejected it:
The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The im-

portance of his election and the vital character of its relationship to and
effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too
strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper use of
money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that
power.

Thus, the Court held that Congress has the power to regulate presidential elections because it must-because such a power must exist in a republic. Indeed, in a similar case the Court pronounced it "a waste of
time to seek for specific sources of the power to pass these laws." 42

If

the Court has been willing to make these kinds of inferences to find
congressional power to assure the responsiveness of federal elections to
the popular will, why may it not plausibly infer the existence of a right
to vote so that the people need not rely on Congress to protect them?
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, and now Justices Thomas and
Scalia, have issued ominous warnings against the Court's entry into the
realm of political theory.4 m Yet political theory was the guiding princi423See id. at
424

547-48.
See id at 544.

'25 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
4 ("The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the
same throughout the United States.").
12GSee id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except
as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
127Burroughs,290 U.S. at 545.
428 ExParteYarbrough, 110 U.S. 651,666
(1884).
429 SeegeneraUy Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 286-97 (1962) (Frankfurter,J.,
dissenting);
see also Holder v. Hall, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2596 (1994) (ThomasJ, concurring); Reynolds v.
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ple in Burroughs,to say nothing of its role in guiding the outcome of
4
such constitutionally canonical cases as McCulloch v. Maryland 1 Justices Thomas and Scalia seem to think that the Court lurches blindly
when it takes up political theory. In truth, the Court seems more often
to lurch blindly either because it lacks a coherent political theory, or because it allows such theories to penetrate its jurisprudence adventitiously, as in the case of communitarian democracy. The confusion
surrounding the constitutional and statutory right to vote is unlikely to
be resolved until the Court steels itself to face this fact.

Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 621-24 (1964) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
431 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Justice Marshall's notions of the political
theory
underlying the Constitution led him, for example, to conclude that the Constitution was
made by the people of the United States and not the states, that it may be construed to
contain implied powers and limitations upon state power, and that there must in general
be some congruity between the powers exercised by a government and the polity to
which it is responsive. See id.
The Court also has not shrunk from applying an overtly political theory of democratic self-government in its First Amendment holdings. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971);
see alsoJ. Harvie Wilkinson, HI, The Supreme Court, the EqualProtectionClause, andthe Three
Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 961-963 (1975) (arguing that both
equality and free speech aim to keep American political life fluid and to prevent selfperpetuation in power as both preserve viable political opposition in situations where
self-limitation seems unlikely).

